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ABSTRACT
The pwpose ofmy thesis is 10 analyse the possibility ofdeliberate self-deception.
The analysis is developed in two stages. First, I provide an analysis oftbe term 'self·
deception' and the problems that this term presents for philosophers. Second, [analyse
the possibility ofon panicular kind ofself-deception, namely, deliberately making
oneselfbelieve whal one knows is false.
Even a superficial glance over the literalUre on self-deception reveals the variety
of interpretations of the tcnn 'self-deception'. The differences betweco philosophers'
interpretations of the lena makes it hanl. to understand what can and what cannal be
called'self-deception: [n order 10 analyse the possibility ofdeliberale self-deception, I
must know whal self-deception is. The analysis of the tenn 'self-deception' turns oullo
be a ratherpainslaking enlerprise. and I have to separate out !be several meanings of the
word. [n the end oftbe analysis, I present two meanings of,self-deception' in ordinary
language, as well as explain the diversity ofinlerprelations the concept has in
philosophical discourse.
When I have reached understanding ofwhat the Ierttl 'self-deception' means in
ordinary language and how it is used by different philosophers, I proceed to the analysis
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of the possibility ofdelibernte self-deception. I use lhe notion ofdeliberateness in order
to distinguish between previously intended and intentional actions which are DOt intended
beforehand. Not all intentional actions requin: any thinking or deciding before the action
is carried out. Deliberate self-deception is an intended action of making oneselfbelieve
what one knows is false. The analysis of the poSSIbility ofdeliberate self-deception is
meant to demonstrate the extent to which one can control what one believes. The
possibility ofsuch control provides a basis for claiming that the self-deceivers make
themselves believe wbat they know is false. The conclusion of my analysis is that
deliberate self-deception is possible. but it is possible only in certain circumstances
without whidt any anempt to deceive oneself fails. The basic methods for such deception
arc forgetting what one knows and reinterpreting evidence for one's beliefs.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Questions like 'What is self-deception?' and 'How is self-deception possible?' fonn
the core oftbe problem of self-deception. Philosophers have discovered that self-
deception presents a challenge for many beliefs about the nature of mind, the self, and
rationality. Naturally, philosophers have adopted different stances towards self-decep-
tion: some are claiming that self-deception does not present any challenge at all, others -
that self-deception provides an important insight into the nature of mind. Because of the
lively discussion that the problem of self-deception has generated, self-deception fonDS a
distinct area of interest for the philosophy ofmind and the philosophy of psychology.
When I chose to write my thesis on self-deception, the question which I intended
to answer was whether it is possible to make m)'!ielfbelieve something that I am disposed
not to believe. The fonnulation of the question was also the fonnulation of my under-
standing of what self-deception is. The question about the possibility to controlling, or
manipulating, one's beliefs may seem strange, but in fact there is a certain philosophical
tradition behind it. The requirement of controlling one's mind bas been known since the
times ofStoics and Buddhists, and the ethics ofself-eontrol bas had its adherents ever
since. A peculiar version ofmis ethical tradition is depicted in EitheriOrby Soren
Kierkegaard. In "Rotation ofCrops," Kierkegaard presents methods ofmaking one's life
interesting even under the most boring conditioDS. One ofthe methods is the art of
forgetting and remembering (293). Ifone knows bow to remember something in a way
one wants and 10 forget everything one wants, one is Mable to play shuttlecock with all
existence" (294). While this art concerns only forgetting and remembering, it seems to
imply that one can believe whalever one wants. And [wanted to know to what extent. if
any. one could control one's beliefs.
As one can see. the context of the problem is very different from what philoso--
phers usually do in the philosophy ofmind. Nevertheless, there is a definile connection
between the possibility ofcontrolling one's beliefs and the problem of self-deception. By
answering the question of whether it is possible 10 deceive oneself intentionally and be
aware of one's intention, [ will also answer the question about the possibility ofcontrol-
ling one's beliefs. Since there is extensive lileralUre on self-deception in English. I
wanted to know what possibilities for controUing one's beliefs are presented by those who
analyse self-deception.
The firsl discovery I made was the fact that the notion of self-deception is very
ambiguous and constitutes a problem by itself. So my initial interest in how to make
myself believe what I am disposed not to believe might or might not be idenlified by
other philosophers as a characleristic of self-deception. The number ofdifferent defini-
tions of self-deception is surprisingly large. Some philosophers consider the meaning of
the concept a settled matter and do not formulate their own understanding of self-
deception; but if one looks at the definitions that are provided, very rarely one finds two
philosopbers that have identical interpretations oflhe concepL Hence, in order to
undersland what is meant by Ihe tenD 'self-deception' and whether this meaning is
compatible wilb. my interest in Ihe possibility ofcontrolling one's beliefs, I had to answer
the question 'What is self-deception?'
I try to answer the question ofwbat self-<leceptiOD is in Chapter 2 ofmy thesis. In
order to have some criteria for a comparison ofthe different definitioDS, I want 10 concen-
trate my attention on the meaning of the lerm 'self-<le<::eption' in ordinary language.
Analysing different interpretations of the concept, I am first ofall trying to answer the
question wh.ether these interpretations could represent the meaning the term. 'self-decep-
tion' h.as in ordinary language. When the answer is '00,' I explain why philosophers still
use the ordinary language tenn 'self-<leception' for their purposes and wh.at is the connec-
tion betWeen their understanding of'self-<leception' and the meaning of'self-deceptioo' as
it is used in ordinary language.
First. I analyse the method ofdefining self·deception suggested by Raphael
Demos. Demos interprets self-deception as being similar to interpersonal deception, the
only difference being that the former involves one instead oftwo persoDS. The result is a
paradoxical formulation ofself-deception. namely, making oneselfbe!ieve what one
knows is faIse. Demos' approach seems very natural, because the word 'deception' docs
appear in the term. 'self-deception' and 'deception' usually refers to a situation where one
person deceives another. My analysis ofDemos' method ofdefining 'self-deception' as an
interpersonal deception lhat occurs in one person shows that this method cannot reveal
the meaning the concept has in ordinary language. This conclusion applies not only to
Demos but also to all those who analyse the meaning of the word 'deception' in order to
derive from it the meaning ofthe term. 'self-deception.'
At the same time, I have to admit that one ofthe meanings that the term 'self-
deception' has in ordinary language is paradoxical and Demos' interpretation has pre-
sented this meaning quite well. I describe this paradoxical meaning ofthe ordinary
language term 'self-deception' as making oneselfbeLieve what one knows is false. I also
have to admit that the meaning of'self-deception' is not always paradoxical. Since I
objected to Demos' method ofdefming the term 'self-deception; the only way to discern
other meanings of'self-deception' is to descn1>e how the word is used in ordinary
language. The second part ofChapter 2 is meant 10 describe the non-paradoxical
meanings the term 'self-deception' bas in ordinary language.
One of the occasions when philosophers analyse the ordinary language meaning
of ,self-deception' is the discussion ofCanfield and Gustavson's and Siegler's interpre·
lations of'self-deception.' Slightly simplifYing their interpretation, I can say that they
claim that 'self-deception' means nothing more than an unwarranted belief. In a way [
defend this position. but only to claim that this definition depicts the usage of the
expression 'to deceive oneself' and nol the usage of'sclf-deception.' At the same time, I
try to show that there is a meaning of'self-deception' that resembles the one of'deceiving
oneself.' The second meaning that the tenD. 'self-deception' has in ordinary language can
be defined as certain state ofmind where the false belief is caused by a bias ofevidence.
Still, the various uses of,self-deception' [have described so fae arejust some of the
interpretations philosophers have provided. Moreover, most ofthesc: interpretations do
not present the meaning that the tenn has in ordinary language. So I continue with my
explanation ofwhy so many interpretations do not fit any oftbe meanings that 'self-
deception' has in ordinary language. [explore the idea that philosophers are trying to
explain certain bebaviour that is usually associated with the tenn 'self-deception.'
In Chapter 3 ( return to my initial question about the possibility ofcontrolling
one's own beliefs. After [bave analysed the meaning of the tenn 'seLf-deception; I can
indicate how my problem ofself-control fits into the problem ofself-deception. Some
interpretations of self-deception imply that the self-deceivCf intentionally brings about bis
or her beliefs. The suggestion that one controls one's beliefs in self-deception represents
the most extreme version ofsuch intentional formation of beliefs. I call this extreme
version 'deliberate self-deception,' intending to refer to self-deception that is brought
about by a conscious intention to make oneselfbelieve what one knows is false or an
intention to make onesc:lfbelieve what one wants to believe.
I examine three possible fonus of deliberate self-deception. All ofthem are
discussed by other philosophers. Fitst of all, I concentrate on the possibility of making
oneself'just like that' believe what one knows is false, namely, the possibility of self-
deception as basic action. realization ofwhich does not require any additional intentional
actions. Though usually one would deny that such an act is possible, it seems that
sometimes the possibility ofsuch a basic action is suggested by people. I wiU by to
present some reasons why self-deception as a basic action is impossible.
In the remaining part of my thesis I address the question of the possibility of
deliberate self-deception that is not basic action. that is to say, deliberate self-deception
that is realized by means of some additional actions. l analyse two types ofactions. The
first type could be characterized as making oneself forget what one knows. The second
type - as reinlerpreting of the evidence one knows. My conclusion is that it is possible 10
make onesclfbelieve what one Icnows is false. For such self-deception 10 be possible one
first of all has to deliberately undermine one's knowledge of the falsity of the belief,
because one cannot consciously hold both the beliefthatp and Icnowledge that not~p. The
success ofdeliberate self-deception never depends completely on the intention ofthe self-
deceiver, and deliberate self-deception is possible only in particular circumstances.
2.0 WHAT [S SELF-DECEPTION?
[dare to say that anybody who decides to enlighten themselves on the subject of
self-deception and wants to do this by~g philosophers will quickly lose any compre-
hension of what self-deception is. Philosophers quite often undermine our everyday
understanding ofconcepts and phenomena, but in the case ofself-deception the feeling of
confusion is caused by the great variety ofinlerpretations. For example. Stanley Paluch
says that a person X is self-deceived when:
(I) Xbelievesp andp is false. (2)Xknows the evidence which counts against the
truth ofp. (3) Xhas some motive for discounting the evidence. (4) lfthe motive
were lackingXwouldsee thatp is false and its oegatioDtrue. (5) [fthemotive
were made clear to Xhe would see that it provided no legitimate grounds for his
belief. (6) Xis free to discern the character of his motive (276).
According to Frederick Siegler. if White says to Brown that Brown is deceiving
himself. ~White is telling Brown that he has an erroneous belief, and he is implying that it
is unreasonable for Brown to have such a belief" (473). Herbert Fingarette thinks that
~the self-deceiver is one who is in some way engaged in the world but who disavows the
engagement, who will not acknowledge it even to bimselfas hi$~ rSelf-Deception~81).
Robert Audi claims:
A person. S. is in a stale of self-deception with respect to a proposition, p, if and
only if: (1) Sunconsciously knows that not1' (or bas reason to believe, and
unconsciously and truly believes. that oot1'); (2) S sincerely avoW$, or is disposed
to avow sincerely, tbatp; and (3) S has at least one want that explains. in part.
both why Ss belief that not-p is unconscious and why S is disposed 10 avow that
p, even when presented with what he sees is evidence against p (94).
John v. Canfield and Don F. Gustavson say that ~all that happens in self-decep-
tion. . is thai the person believes or forgets something in certain cin:wnstances~ and the
circumslances are such that the evidence does not warrant the belief in question (34-35).
Jeffrey Foss writes that "Jones deceives himsclfthatp just in case (i) lones brings it about
thatjBp (Jones believes thatpJ, and (ii)jK-p [Jones knows that notpJ" (241).
I could continue this list, but it is already clear that there is no agreement among
philosophers on what self-deception is. Fingarene thinks that self-deception concerns
engagements in the world, while the rest of the mentioned philosophers talk about beliefs
that p and not-po Foss insists that self-deception requires two contradictory beliefs, while
Audi, Canfield, Gustavson, Siegler and Paluch relate self-deception to the presence of
one unwarranted belief. Foss' phrase that Jones brings about a beliefsuggests that Jones
intentionally deceives himself, Paluch's mentioning of'motive for discounting' and
fingarette's 'disavowing of the engagement' could suggest the intention on the pan ofthe
self-deceiver, bUlthe rest ofthe interprelations do not imply sucb intentional deception at
all. Audi thinks that self-deception requires an unconscious knowledge, while other
philosophers do not mention either unconscious koowledge or beliefs.
One could think: that at least some philosophers have defined self-deception
incorrectly, and a good analysis of the concept would eliminate the multiplicity of
interpretations. No doubt, philosophers do argue about the proper way to define self·
deception. For example. Foss thinks lhat "Gustavson. Canfield, & co. (meaning Patrick
Gardiner and Terence Penelhwn]" have missed a very important aspect of self-deception-
- duplicity (238). At the same time. despite the criticisms ofone or another definition.
there is still a great diversity among the interpretations that one can find in the literature
on self-deception. And it seems that these interpretations exist side by side without
undermining each other's validity. At least, some philosophers are ready to admit the
validity of interpretations different from their own (See, for example. Siegler 475).
I think that the diversity of interpretations asks for an explanation. Even if the
topic afmy thesis does not compel me to explain this diversity. I cannot ignore it. In
order to proceed to the question ofdeliberate self-deception. r must have some under-
standing of what self-deception is. [f I just accepted one definition lhat seemed more
suitable for the topic of my thesis. I would not know how this definition is related to the
others. [would not know whether different interpretations ofwhat self-deception is are
different definitions of the same pbenomenon, or they are descriptions of different
phenomena under one name, or descriptions ofdifferent usages ofthe word 'self-decep-
tion.' Since I am interested to know what other philosophers have said about the possibil-
ity of deliberate self-deception, I cannot just choose one. more convenient, interpretation,
because there is no reason to presume that it will allow me to understand what other
philosophers mean when they are talking about self-deception. Therefore. in this chapter
I want to explain the great variety among the definitions ofself-deception, and I think that
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by doing this I will be able to darify for myselfwbat self-deception is.
To find my way through this multitude ofinterpretal:ions. I want to concentrate
my attcntionon the term 'self-deception' and the meaningoflhis term in orrlinary Ian·
guage. When I say that I will concentrate my attention on the meaning ofthe word in
ordinary language, I do not intend to say that I wiUjustdescribe the usage of the word. I
want to use lhe meaning ofordinary language as a basis for comparison of different
interpretations. I want to detect how close or bow far from lhc ordinary meaning these
interpretations arc. My choice aCthe basis ofcomparison is not arbitrary; 'self-deception'
is a word ofordinary language and was used before philosopbers started to discuss this
concept; I presume that philosophers' understanding of'self-deceptioo' bas something to
do with 'self-deception' ofordinary language, otheawi.se it would be bard to understand
why philosophers use this word. I think that by revealing this correlation I will be able to
answer the question, "What is self-deception?"
In Section 2.1, [concentrate my attention on the claims that self-deception must
be understood as interpersonal deception carried out by a person on himself or herself
This method of defining 'self-deception' results in a paradoxical account ofself-decep-
tion. I claim that this method ofdefining self-deception cannot provide one with the
understanding of the ordinary language term 'self-deception.' Nevenheless. I admit that
the ordinary language tenn 'self-deception' has a paradoxical meaning. 'Self-deception'
means making oneselfbelieve what one knows is false. In Section 2.2, I describe the
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non-paradoxical meaning that the term 'sclf-deception' bas in ordinary language. Before
providing this non-paradoxical meaning, I have to reject two plausible versions of this
meaning. In the first pan of$ection 2.2 ftUnusua! Ways of Deceiving Oncselt" I show
some occasions wben a person could be descnbed as deceiving onese~ but only if the
expression '10 deceive oneself' is used in some particular sense that differs from the usc of
the term 'self-deception' in ordinary language. In the second part ofSection 2.2 "'Deceiv·
ing oneself and Unwarranted Belief," I analyse and ultimately reject onc interpretation of
the tenn 'self-deception' that describes self-deception as a discrepancy between some
belief and evidence for this belief. I claim that this interpretation depicts the usage oftbe
expression 'to deceive oneself and not the meaning nfthe term 'self-deception.' In the
third part ofSection 2.2 "'Self-Deception' and Biased Believing," I provide one
interpretation nfthe term 'self-deception' that seems to me a correct description ofnon-
paradoxical meaning oftbe term in ordinary language. In Section 2.3. I try to explain
what is common between the paradoxical meaning of ,self-deception' that the term has in
ordinary language and the variery ofdefinitions of'self-deception' provided by philoso-
phers.
2.1 Self-Deception and Other-Deception
A natural way to find out the meaning of the word 'self-deception' seems to be
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consulting a dictionary. Unfortunately, a standard English dictionary is not much of help
to mc. The OED for example defines self-deception as an act or state ofdeceiving
oneself. This definition is cln::ular and is not informative. It explains that self-deception
can be an act or a state. but it does not tell me what kind ofact or state self-deception is,
whereas [am interested in knowing exactly the natUre ofthis state or act.
At the same time. one could interpret this definition as a suggestion that self·
deception is a particular case ofdeception. where 'deception' bas to be understood on the
model of interpersonal deception. This approach could work approximately like this: (a)
the word 'self-knowledge' consists of two parts, 'self' and 'knowledge;' when I know what
'knowledge' means and what 'self means. I caD easily deduce that self-knowledge is just
like knowledge only the subject aCknowledge is specified - the self; (b) the word 'self-
deception' consists of two parts, 'sclr and 'deception;' when I know the meaning ofbolh
of them f will know the meaningof'self-deception.' To find out the necessary and
sufficient conditions for ascribing the word 'deception,' [analyse, for example, a sentence
'John deceives Peter;' to know what self-deception is, I simply replace 'Peter' with
'himself.'
There are some philosophers woo accept this way of understanding 'self-decep-
tion.' and one of them is Raphael Demos. Demos' article "Lying to Oneself' is the anic1e
that brings the term 'self-deception' into the sphere ofphilosophical interest. Even though
the first philosopher who mentions self-deception is most likely Plato, before Demos
13
'self-deception' has not been among the concepts that inspire philosophers. Self-decep.
tion has been discussed among Christian moralists, for example, Samuel Johnson and
Bishop Butler have articulated their perception of self-deception, and Daniel Dyke's book
The Mystery ofSelj.Deception. which was wrinen in the beginning of 17th century, is
most likely the fust book on sclf.deception. Nevertheless, neither of these moralists finds
the concept ofsetf-deccption in any way puzrling. As ordinary users of language, they
know whcn to apply the word and are not interested in spelling out its meaning. When
Demos tried to define Ute concept ofself-deception and analyse its implications, he
quickly provoked a criticism oCms definition. thus starting the discussion. On the whole.
philosophers dismiss Demos' analysis oC'sclf-decepnon' as incorrect. At the same time.
Demos' anicle on self-deception 'gave a tunc' for the later discussion ofself-deception,
and some aspects of this discussion are hard to understand unless one knows what Demos
did with 'self-deception.'
The problem of self-deception, as it is stated by Demos, resembles a puzzle meant
to sharpen one's mind. Demos begins his article ~Lying to Oneselr' by laying down die
conditions oflhe intellectual exercise (588). FirstofaJl, one has to assume that words
'lying' and 'deceiving' have identical meaning. Demos recognizes lhat the meanings are
not identical, but he asks the reader to ignore this fact. Secondly, one bas to assume that
the phrase "B lies to (deceives) eft means that the deceiver, or liar, intends to induce a
mistaken belief in another person and succeeds in carrying out his intention. Moreover,
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the deceiver knows that what he teUs aoother person is false:. Demos acknowledges that
one can deceive a person without intending to do so and iliat one can lie without causing
anybody to believe one's lies; nevertheless, Demos deliberately disregards these aspects
ofdeception. Only after one has acccplcd both conditions. is Demos ready to show the
problem in which he is interested He reformulates his description ofintcrpcrsonal
deception so that the act ofdeception is presented as occurring within onc person.
According to Demos, "self-deception exists •. when a person lies to himself. that is to
say. persuades himself to believe what he knows is not so" (588). Thus stated, self-
deception seems to be impossible. Forcltample. one can try 10 persuade oneselflo
believe that grasshoppers eat people. and most likely one will fail. l To make things
worse, Demos interprets his formulation as implying that the self-deceiver believes some
propositionp and the negation ofthis proposition at the same time (588). He also
declares that both beliefs are consciously held (592). Thus Demos has formulated what
philosophers like 10 call 'the paradox ofself-deception: because it seems impossible to
believe in a proposition that one knows to be false. Alfred Mele calls this paradox the
'static paradox:,' which he distinguishes from the 'dynamic' paradox ("Recent" I). The
term 'dynamic paradox' is used to describe the apparent difficulty ofmaking oneself
believe something that is known to be false. The challenge in Demos' puzzle of self·
lThis example is meant to show why Demo's definition is often called
paradoxical, and it is not meant to prove that Demos is wrong.
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deception is to find out how such intentional and paradoxical self-deception is possible.
A specific characteristic ofDemas' treabncnt aCthe concept of self-deception is
his indifference 10 other possible meanings ofthis concept. He is not interested in
knowing wbether'self-deceptioo' in everyday language has the same meaning as 'self-
deception' in his formulation. Describing the conditions thai must be realized in order for
us to call something self-deception. he chooses conditions similar to those of'deception'
in the interpersonal context, and he does not inquire whctbcr it is possible to define 'self-
deception' otherwise. In addition. Demos ignores other possible meanings aCtbe word
'deception: Since according to Demos the concept of self-deception is derived from the
concept ofdeception. be attributes 10 'self-deception' a very specific and narrow sense.
This lack of interest on the pan ofDemas does not make other interpretations of
self-deception less real. Unfortunately. it is easy 10 overlook the variations. To illustrate
how different meanings of'self-deceptioo' can be confused, I want to show an under-
standing of self-deception that is radically different from Demos' understanding and
which Demos bimselfiocorrectly equates with the one he presented in his article. I am
referring to Plato's concept ofself-deception. Demos claims that his and Plato's under-
standing ofself-deception are the same (588). Plato mentions self-deception rather
casually in the dialogue Crary/us, and he does oot explicate what precisely he understands
by it. Despite Plato's terseness. it is possible to leU the difference between his and
Demos' understanding of'self-deception.'
,.
Plato's dialogue Craty/us discusses the question ofbow names relate to the things
they namc. At one place in the dialogue. the discussion of names is interrupted by the
exchange ofcompliments about the wisdom of the interlocutors. Cratylus is so impressed
by everything Socrates says that he suggests that some Muse resides in Socrates and
speaks through him (42&). Socrates agrees and complains that he cannot trust his own
wisdom and words he utters. En this context, Plato says that there is nothing worse than
self-deception, because "the deceiver is always at home and always with you" (428d).
(t is possible that Plato truly means to suggest the existence of some spiritual
entity that resides somewbere inside a human being and can be truthful or deceptive. rt
seems to me. nevertheless, that the remedy against self-deception Plato indicates implies
a more interesting understanding of'self-deception.' In order to avoid deceiving himself,
Socrates has to examine all the claims he makes and retrace the course of his argument, or
"steps" (428d). lfrn fact Socrates spoke for some Muse, or some other divine being, then
the scrutiny ofthoughts would be useless; Socrates could not influence his alrer ego even
if he wanted. Moreover, lhe multiplicity of personality would not explain why Socrates
describes the deception as deception ofoneself. I am suggesting that Socrates speaks
about his thoughts as if they were imposed upon him because he does not understand how
the thinking process works and how thoughts are generated. Nevertheless, he is not
alienated from his thoughts. because be knows bow to control them. He controls his
thoughts by analyzing them in retrospect.
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It seems 10 me that for Plato. self-deception cbarac1erises the process ofreasoniDg
or, more precisely, enoneous reasoning. Self-deception is a mistake that is caused not so
much by wrong infonnation as in cases ofdeception. but rather by inaccurate tbinlcing.
Self-deception is worse than deception. because erroneous thinking affects one con-
stantly, while deceivers art: not always around. Also, it is very hard to notice the failure
of one's reasoning, and even Socrates cannot be sure that his wisdom is not deceptive.
The only way be can conttol this kind ofdeception is to review and analyse his train of
thoughts, and to do that often. The analysis needs not be done by the thinker alone. Just
before Socrates mentions self-deception. he encourages Cratylus to criticize everything
Socrates says (428b). Discussion is one way 10 detect faulty thinking and. therefore.
discussion undermines the possibility of self-deception.
Ifmy interpretation ofPlalo is admissible, it is bard to see bow one can equate
Plato's understanding of self-deception with lhe interpretation of'self-deception' that
Demos presents in his anicle. Demos declares that the self-deceiver intends to make
himself believe something that is false, wbile knowing that what he wants to believe is
false. Plato's self-deceivet does not need to have either the intention to deceive himself,
or the knowledge ofthe falsity of his beliefs. For Plato, one must work hard to notice the
falsity ofone's beliefs.
It seems that Demos is mistaken when he claims that his understanding of 'self-
deception' is similar to Plato's. It is not similar. Now one can ask why it is not. Are
18
Plato and Demos using different meanings afUte same word? Does Plato misuse the
term? What he caUs 'deception ofoneself seems to 61 better under the naDle 'faulty
reasoning.' Docs Demos misuse the term?
There are two main objections against Demos' interpretation of'self-deception.'
First. philosophers argue lhat lhe word 'deception' need not necessarily imply either that
deception is carried out intentionally or that the deceiver knows that the proposition he
wants others to believe is false. Mele claims that sometimes people use word 'deceive' in
cases when somebody unintentionaJly causes another person 10 believe some proposition
that is false (l"at;onaJity 123). Bas Van Fraasscn argues that Ute deceiver can be
ignorant about the truth aCthe prOposition which he or she wishes 10 deceive others into
believing. For example. if Peter does not know whether some bridge is safe. but he wants
John to believe that the bridge is safe. Peter could deceive John by penuading him that
the bridge is safe (124). Brian Mclaughlin claims that the deceiver can even believe in
the truth of the proposition about wroch be~ she wants other people to be deceived. For
example, evidence appears to prove that Dick is guilty of some wrong-doing; Tom
believes that Dick is innocent and by lying persuades Harry to believe in the innocence of
Dick (35). Since Demos derives his definition of'self-deception' from the definition of
'deception,' changes in the laner can cause cbanges in the fonner.
The problems with the definition of'deception' do not undermine the main
principle ofdefining 'self-deception' on the basis ofhow the word 'deception' is under·
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stood.. This principle seems very SCDSl"ble. The connection between the concept ofself·
deception and the cooc:ept ofdeception looks evidenl:: the term 'sd.f~'includes
lhe word 'deception: I can explain what 'self-deception' is. AI fust, I analyse the
meaning oftbe concept ofdeceptioo in the interpersonal context; next. I describe a
pattern ofdeception in a case when deception is DOt directed towards another person, but
towards oneself. This approacb demonstrates lhe reason for the presence aCme word
'deception' in the concept ofself-deception, while for example in the case of Plato, it is
not clear why one would talk about deception at all.
Despite the appealing simplicity ofDemos' approach, not all philosophers like his
way ofdefining 'self-deception.' Several ofthem have argued that 'self-deception' cannot
be analysed in the same terms as 'deception.' Tbis is the secmd and lbc most important
objection againsl Demos'definition. It is more important thaD the first ooc., because ifil
is true that lhe meaning of'self-dcaptioo' cannot be obtained by analysing the meaning
of'deception,' then it is noIimportaDt for the defining of'self-deception' bow the word
'deception' is interpreted.
The first philosophers who argued against Demos' method ofdefining 'self-
deception' are Canfield and Gustavson. They claim that any explanation of'self-decep.
tion' using the concepts ofinterpersonaI deception reqwres the presupposition that 'self·
deception' can be properly undentood only in terms ofinterpenonal deception, or other·
deception (32). Canfield and Gustavson defy this presupposition and sbow that in other·
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deception and self-deception 'deception' can mean different lhings.
The argument by Canfield and Gustavson is directed against the method of
defining that was used by Demos, namely, to explain terms like 'self-deception' by
explicating the part nfthe term that comes after 'self-'. lfthis method were correct, then
'self..command' should be understood as being similar to 'command: or 'other<ommand,'
specifying that the commander was identical with the person that received the command
(33). Or, using Milce V. Martin's example. 'teaching oneself should be understood in
terms orteaching others (19). Canfield and Gustavson claim that 'self-command' cannot
be understood in tenns ofother-eommand. To justify their claim, they first of all disclose
the assenions that are implied by the notion ofcommand. Then. they apply these
assertions to the notion of self-command. They believe that the resuJt demonstrates that
this juxtaposition of'other-command' and'self-eommand' is inappropriate.
Canfield and Gustavson consider Doe instance of'other-command' that they
fotnlulate as 'Jones makes Smith do E: The formulation is strange because to say that
'Jones commands Smith jump' is not the same as saying 'Jones makes Smith 10 jump.'
The laner implies that Smith in factjwnps, while the former need not imply that: Jones
commands, but Smith ignores him. Canfield and Gustavson seem to be tallcing about a
successful command. It is possible that Canfield and Gustavson wanted to emphasize the
similarity between 'command' and 'deception' which, according to the standard interpreta.
tion, implies that the deceiver succeeds in deceiving the other person.
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According to Canfield and Gustavson,. the assertions that arc implied by the
statement 'Jones makes Smith do E' are: (a) Jones intends to make Smith do E; (b) Jones
asks (commands,lells, ctc.) Smith 10 do E; (e) Smith takes Jones' request (command, etc.)
as a request to do E; (d) Smith complies with (obeys, etc.) Jones' request to do E (33). If
one wants to present an instance ofasuccessful self-command and to interpret it as
similar to the case ofother-COlI1lD.and. the sentence 'Jones makes himself study all night'
must be interpreted as implying that "JODes intends to make himselfstudy all night. Jones
asks (commands, etc.) himselfto study all night, Jones lakes his own request as a request
to study all night, and Jones complies with his own request to study all night" (33-34). It
is clear that on this interpretation of'self-command' the part that corresponds to (e) is
redundant. Jones does not have to interpret his own requests and orders in addition to
saying them.! I also would deny lhat the word 'complies' can be used 10 describe the
cormcction between a command Jones utters and the action that follows. Therefore.
Canfield and Gustavson suggest that 'self-command' cannot be understood in terms of
other--command. Correspondingly, the whole method ofdefining the concepts that have
the fonn 'self·;c' by deriving their definition from the definition ofthe part that follows
lAt least, one is not considering one's own orders in the same way one considers
the orders of somebody else. It is possible that one analyses the reasons for one's own
orders. For example. Jones thinks that the commands he is giving to himselfare meant to
silence his wish to go to bed. Nevertheless, I doubt that Jones could think that the
command was meant to be ajok:e when it was not, while any other person could have
such. a thought, and it is meaningful to say that Smith took Jones' command to be a real
command and not just ajoke.
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'self·' is shown to be unreliable. because Canfield and Gustavson have shown that there is
one instance where this method does not work.
Martin comes up with another example where, according 10 him, the method used
by Demos cannot provide the proper understanding of the temI. He uses the example of
'tcaching' and 'teaching oneself: ODe small problem with this example is that lhere is no
such. a tenn as 'self-teaching' in ordinary language. Neither 'self-taught' nor 'teaching
oneself are strictly parallel 10 the term 'self-deception.' And as [will show later, 'sc(f-
deception' is not always replaceable by 'deceiving oneself: Al the same time, I think that
this problem does IlOt really undermine Martin's idea, because there is a term that is very
similar to Martin's 'teaching onesetf,' and the term is 'self-instruction.' This term also bas
the related forms 'self-instructed' and 'instructing oneself which make it similar to
Martin's 'teaching oneself and Demos' 'self-deception."
The examples of 'teaching' and 'instructing' are interesting because ofone
imponant resemblance with 'deception.' Uthe meaning of 'teaching oneself or 'self-
instruction' is derived from the meaning of'teaching' and 'instructing,' it seems that the
first two will be as paradoxical as the concept of self-deception. The concept ofteacmng
usually implies that one person knows something that another person does not (Martin
(9). The same is true about 'instruction.' Ifone knows everything that the instructor is
telling one, one hardly would call this process an instruction. For example. in case of
'The example of ,self-instruction' is used also by William Ruddick in his article
"Social Self-Deception" (384-385).
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somebody instrUCting me in learning Greek. I presumably do not know how 10 do it. So if
one wants 10 consider 'self-instruction' as the correlate of'instruction: onc bas to assume
that persons who instruct themselves bom know and do not know bow to perform some
action. know and do not know the content ofinstructioos. {fin the case of'sclf-dec:eption'
the paradoxical meaning seemed probable, in the case of'self·instruction: the interpreta-
tion obtained by juxtaposing 'instruction' and 'self-instruction' clearly gives wrong
results.~ When [am saying that [am instructing myself, [am saying that I am learning to
do, or I am doing. something without an instructor, or without knowing beforehand the
instructions, and I am nol suggesting that [ somehow simultaneously know and do not
know these instructions.
Now one could ask why 'self-instruction' is caUed 'instruction,' if in fact it is
nothing more than learning. It is very hard to answer the question why such a tenn has
laken roots in the language. but [can indicate some com:lations between 'instruction' and
'self-instruction.' First ofall, self-instruction could be a process of doing something
without instructions while usually one would not do this without them. For example. I
can try to leam languages on my own without knowing how to do this, while usually one
'The paradoxical result is obtained only ifone interprets the word 'instruction' as
implying an intetpersollal action. [fthe word 'instruction' is understood as meaning, for
example, 'guidance ofaction' without clarifying whether the process is interpersonal or
not, the paradox does oot emerge. Nevertheless, Demos as welJ as Canfield and
Gustavson presume the tem 'deceptioo' to imply an interpersonal action, and I am
following their example.
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would ask somebody for insttuction on bow to do this. Or I can tl)' to build a house or
play piano without previous knowledge. On all ofthese occasions [can say that I am
self-instructed, because nobody else has instnlCted me. Secondly, I would usc the word
'self-instruction' 10 describe a situation when [am using instructions that are prqlared by
some person who is absent. For example, I am using a book How to Build Howes. The
instructions are given by the person who wrote the book, but there is nobody who will
infonn me ofthese instructions except myself and, therefore. I can say that [am instruct-
ingmyself.
It seems that there are reasons for using the word 'instruction' 10 describe actions
like learning languages wilhout a tutor. The problem is that one cannot know in advance
how the word 'instruction' must be used in order 10 explain 'self·instruetion.' Knowing the
meaning of'insuuction' is not enough for understanding of 'self-deception 'j one should
know the meaning of'self-instrucrioo' in order to know which aspect aCthe word
'instruction' one bas in mind when one speaks of 'self-deception'.
The same is true about the way one understands 'a successful self-command:
When Jones makes himselfstudy aU night, he does not need to conunand himselfto study
all night and take his own command as a command to study all night, as the meaning of
'make somebody to do something' implies. At the same time, one can articulate one's
intention to study all night and do it in the form that resembles an interpersonal com·
mand. There will be resemblance between the articulation ofan intention and the
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imcrpersonal command, but one has to know bow 'self-command,' or 'make myself do
somelhing: is used in order 10 detect what the resemblance is.
Now I can explain why Plato calls erroneous reasoning 'self-deception.' He does
not derive the meaning ofdeception by analyzing interpersonal deception. The erroneous
reasoning can be called 'self-deception' because a person that em can be viewed as being
misled. When somebody deceives me. be misleads me. If I am misled by my failure to
reason properly, [can say that [deceived myself.
When Demos defines 'self-deception: he detennines at first lhe meaning of
'deception' and then, depending on the meaning of'deception: determines the meaning of
'self-deception.' This method cannot guarantee that one will be able to understand what is
meant by 'self-deception' in ordinary language, or what Plato means by 'self-deception.'
In both cases, the meaning of'deception' can be used in a quite different way than it was
used by Demos. Since Demos' method ofclarifying the meaning ofa concept cannot
guarantee a reliable interpretation oCthe concept, the definition of'self-deception' thai is
formulated in terms ofother-deception camot be binding for anybody who is asking how
'self-deception' must be understood. There must be some other way to determine the
meaning of the concept 'self-deception,' and I think that the other way is 10 describe how
the concepl is used in ordinary language.
Demos' definition of'self-deceplion' required for a self-deceiver to know simulla·
neously that some proposition p is true and to believe thatp is false, and it also required
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that the self-decciver somehow intentionally make- himselfor herselfbclieve what be or
she knows is false. [showed that lhe method Demos used to define 'self-deception'
cannot provide me with the meaning that this term bas in ordinary language. One could
tlUnk that ifDemos' mterpretation of'sclf-deception' is not binding upon anybody
studying self-deception, one is free from the hardest pan afthe problem: paradoxes of
self-deception. Demos' idea ofdefining 'self-deception' on the model of'deccptioo'
seemed to create both the static and dynamic paradoxes of self-deception; since Demos'
method ofdefining turned out to be unreliable. one might assume thai one can just reject
the paradoxes as a result of faulty thinking.
The strange thing is that the analysis aClhe everyday meaning of'self-deception'
seems to throw me back where I started. Demos' definition presents quite precisely one
of the meanings that 'self-deception' has in ordinary language. Let me look at an example
of self-deception: some boy is cruel to animals; bis mother bas seen some occasions when
he killed seven bumble-bees, and other people have reported to her similar episodes in
her son's life; nevertheless. she denies that her son is crnel to animals. and it seems that
she really believes what she says. This is a situation when one could ascribe to the
mother self-deception. Asked what one means by this claim. one could say thai the
mother knows that her son is ernel to animals (after aU. she saw him being so). but she
lnlentionally ignores the evidence and makes herselfbelieve that he is a good boy. At
this poin! in my analysis. it is not imponant whether the mother really knows thai he is
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cruel or whether she intentionally ignores this knowledge, I just want to clarify what
people would mean by saying that the mother is self..<feceived. I think that 'sclf-docep-.
tion' in ordinary language has the meaning I descnbed, and evidently, this meaning is
similar 10 the meaning that Demos presented in his articlc.
Initially, the fact that Demos' interpretation of'self-deception' coincides with one
of the meanings that 'self-deception' has in ordinary language could look. a little bit
embarrnssing. Twenty pages of my thesis are spenl to prove that Demos' method is
inadequate just to find out that Demos' interpretation is a quite conventional imcrpretation
ofself-deceplion. Nevertheless, I dare 10 claim lhat these pages are not just a collection
of vanities. There are three conclusions that this analysis has helped me to reach.
The First Conclusion. The fact that the word 'deception' is usually used to
describe an act by which a person deceives some other person does not have to imply that
'self-deception' designates the same act only carried out on oneself. So I would object.
for example, 10 Frederick F. Schmitt's assertion. ~Ifthere is genuine self-deception.
properly so called, it must consist ofdeceiving oneself into believing some proposition~
(189). Consistent with his claims. Schmitt continues by ascribing to 'self-deception' the
conditions of interpersonal deception. My main objection against his claim. concerns the
usage of the words 'genuine' and 'properly: As far as [can see, everything that in
ordinary language bears the name 'self-deception' is genuine self-deception. Even Lfthe
name is used to denote something that is not like internal deception. I cannot see the
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rcason for claiming that it is not genuine self-deception.
l also doubt that one can say that the absence of an act ofdeception somehow
makes lhe name 'self-deception' inappropriate. 'Self-deception' is a word ofordinary
language and, as far as ordinary language is concerned, 10 question the choiceofwords
for designation ofone or another phenomenon seems to me rather fruitless enterprise.
Are butterflies named properly? Do genuine butterflies, properly so called, have anything
to do with butter? Should one analyse the words 'butter' and 'a fly' to know what
'butterfly' should properly mean? I think that these questions may be asked when one
tries to invent a new name for something, but [cannot see any reason to ask them about a
word of ordinary language.'
Just to give the reader a feeling ofbow confusing for philosophers the word 'self·
deception' has turned out to be. I want to mention one more difficulty that concerns a
'proper' understanding of'sclf-deception.' Several philosophers have presented Mary
Haight as assuming that 'self-deception' properly understood has to be interpreted as
5By claiming that everything that is called self-deception in ordinary language is
properly so called, I do not want to suggest that one could not alter every-day linguistic
practices. CenainIy, one can draw distinctions among objects, for example., different
butterflies, that are nol drawn in ordinary language, or one can specify the meaning of a
word wh.en the word does not have a precise reference. At the same time, I hope that lhe
example of the butterfly shows that one cannot specify the meaning of the word by
analysing the word alone. Whatever the reason for giving the object some name, and
name would do as long as it is clear what one talks about. The problem. with 'self-
deception' is not the fact that the word does not precisely reflect the meaning of
'deception' but thai the meaning of 'self-deception' is unclear.
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interpersonal deception within one penon (for example. Martin 18 and Melc "Recent" 2).
What Haight says is that "iCto deceive oneself is really to deceive, a definition af'A
det:eiyes B' should fit some cases where B and A an:: the same, and these should be the
cases that in fact we caU 'self-deception"' (8). 'Really to deceive' may sound like 'self-
deception properly understood,' but in fact Haight is just saying that if'self-deception' is
understood as interpersonal deception within one person (understood literally). lhen there
must be phenomena that correspond 10 the definition and lhese phenomena must be called
in ordinary language 'self-deception.' As Caras I can see, she is not claiming iliat 'A
deceives A' is the proper understanding of'self-deception.' She just wants to clarify
whether 'self-deception' could mean this. She concludes lhat it could not, that there
cannot be deception within one person and that the tenn 'self-deception' must be under-
stood as a metaphor or a figure of speech (23,52). And sbe does not claim that the
metaphorical expressions are 'improper' expressions or that any understanding of'self·
deception' which does not depict self-deception as deception within one person is
improper.&
The Second Conclusion. Now it is clear lhat the reflections on what are the
sufficient and necessary conditions for ascribing to somebody 'deception' are interesting
in themselves but not very helpful for understanding the sufficient and necessary
conditions for ascribing 'self-deception.' The understanding ofthe word 'deception' can
(> Similarly, Martin misunderstands Kipp's interpretation of'self-deception'
(Martin 18, Kipp 261, 279).
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be helpful for understanding the reasons for calling self..deception 'deception: like
understanding nfthe words 'grass' and 'to bop' can be helpful for understanding Why
certain insects are called 'grasshoppers.' Nevertheless, even ifone or several intcrpreta·
lions of'deception' could be used to explain the meaning aCthe word 'self-deception: one
would not be able to tell which ones without knowing in advance what 'self-deception'
means. So, I can enjoy Van Fraassen's. McLaughlin's, Schmitt's. Anette Barnes' or
Stanley Paluch's thoughts on what are the necessary conditions for something to be
deception. or what are the correlations between 'self-deception' and 'deception.' but I
cannot use these ideas by themselves to determine the meaning aCthe tcnn 'setf-dccep-
tion.'
The Third Conclusion. Even ifthe meaning of ,self-deception' cannot be derived
from the analysis of ,deception,' the word 'self-deception' still can have a meaning that is
apparenlly paradoxical. This conclusion can be rephrased in the fonn of an instruction
for those who try to find their way in the writings on self-deception: 'Do not trust
anybody who claims that the paradox of self-deception stems from the efforts 10 derive
the concept of self-deception from the concept of deception.' Unfortunately. many
philosophers claim or imply this origin of the paradoxes. For example, Mele writes. ~In
both cases [in cases of the static and dynamic paradoxesl. paradox is generated by the
application ofcertain common assumptions about interpersonal deception 10 the
inlrapersonal variety" ("Recent" 1). David Pears. "How can anyone persuade himself
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thatp and yet alll.be time maintain his original betiefthat nOl-p, as the word 'deception'
seems 10 require?" ("The Goals" 59). Martin, "The air of paradox arises when we tryta
understand self.deception by modelling it strictly after interpersonal deception (that is,
the deception ofone person by another)" (13). Ifthey were right, it would be easy to get
rid aCthe paradox. One could simply claim that the paradox can be ignored because the
meaning of'self-deception' does not depend on the meaning of'deceptioo,' and describe
the meanings of'self-deception' that are not paradoxical. Unfortunately, one cannot
ignore the paradox. because it does not depend on the meaning of'deception:
2.2 Non-Paradoxical Meaning of'Self·Deception'
Are there any meanings aCthe term 'self-deception' that are not paradoxical? As
far as I can see. lhe only way to answer this question is to describe the meanings that the
word has in ordinaJy language. Such description can be problematic. It is hard to know
when onc has described aU existent meanings; the only criterion is one's knowledge of
language. No philosopher has altempted to present an exhaustive description of the
meanings that 'self-deception' bas in ordinary language. I will not attempt to do it either,
but [will present and examine some explications of the meaning that have been discussed
by philosophers, and in the end ofmis chapler I will describe a meaning of'self·
deception' thai the lenn has in ordinary language and that is nol paradoxical.
J2
2.2.1 Unusual Ways ofDeceiviDg Oneself
Several philosophers have provided examples of persons who deceive themselves
but still cannot be considered self-deceivers. For example, it is reasonable to say that a
military camouflage expert bas deceived hirnselfwhen he has disguised the field gun so
well that he cannot recognize from distance where exactly the gun is bidden (Cbamplin
"Deceil~ 57). [t is reasonable 10 say that a cocaine dealer has deceived bimselfwhen he,
by submitting tllmsetfto a seance ofbypnosis. makes himself believe that his supplier is
Ronald Reagen (Silver 216). As the authors aCthe examples have recognized, neither of
the cases represents self-deception, and mey conclude that the deception ofoneself is not
always what is called 'self-deception.'
Although [agree that the examples mentioned above are not examples of self·
deception, I must make a brief commen! on why these examples are not examples ofself·
deception. Mawy Silver, lohn Sabini and Maria Miceli have noted that their example of
the dealer is not "an example ofwhal people call 'self-deception." but they also
immediately add that the reason why it is not the right example is because the goal of the
deceiver is not to manipulate his feelings but something else (Silver 216). According to
them, the goal to manipulate feeling is essential for something to be self-deception.
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Similarly, T. S. Champlin claims that the exampteofthe camouflage expert: is not an
example of self-deception, hccausc the aspect ofdishonesty with oneselfand moral
shortcoming is missing ("Deceit" 57). The problem with the claims about what is
missing from these examples is that the conditions which the philosophers claim are
absent are not necessary for using the word 'self-deception.' And I will show later why
they are not. Meanwhile, I want to say that ignorance about the necessary conditions for
ascribing 10 someone 'self-deception' cannot prevent one from dismissing the examples of
the drug dealer and the camouflage expert. [think that anybody who knows English
knows that the word 'self-deception' is oot used in ordinary language to describe such
cases. That is simply not the way 'self-deception' is used. and our knowledge ofthat is
enough for making a distinction between 'self-deception' and 'deceiving oneself as it is
used in the examples ofllie camouflage expert and the drug dealer.
2.2.2 'Deceiving Oneself and Unwarranted Belief
I have already described the paradoxical meaning of'self-deception' that is
ascribed. 10 the word in ordinary language and that bas proved to be a problem. for
anybody who tries to interpret it. At least sometimes. 'self-deception' means that one
makes oneselfbelieve what one knows is false. The paradoxical nature ofthis
fonnulation has caused phitosophen to look for alternative interpretations. Severa!
,.
philosophers have discussed the possibility that 'self-deception' could mean that a person
has not noticed something obvious, at least something that seems obvious io a person
who ascribes self-deception to somebody.
Canfield and Gustavson emphasize the ignorance ofthe obvious and consider it
the basic characteristic oftbe phenomenon that is called 'self-deception.' They claim that
"when Jones deceives himself about P, he believes P in belief-adverse circumstances. or
he forgets P when. ordinarily, onc would remember P" (36).
The notion ofbelief·adverse circumstanccs is a little bit ambiguous. Patrick
Gardiner, for instance, thinks that Canfield and Gustavson's definition can be interpreted
as claiming that some person believes p while disinclined 10 believe p because p seems to
have unpleasant implications (Gardiner 229). For example. John can realize that his
belief that smoking damages lungs implies that he should quit smoking, and while John is
reluctant to quit smoking and challenges any proof that smoking damages lungs. he still
believes that it does. One could say that John believes 'smoking is barmful' in a belief·
adverse circumstance. which in this case is the fact that John nies 10 defy his belief.
Despite the plausibility ofGardiner's interpretation. one cannot accepl it, because
Canfield and Gustavson arc quite clear about what they mean by 'belief·adverse
circumstances.' They mean "circumstances such that the evidence Jones has does not
warrant beliefin P" (34). To say that 'belief·adverse circumstances' means evidence that
does not warrant bcliefinp is not the same as saying that 'belief-adverse circumstances'
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means disinclination 10 believe thatp. Heooe. GardiDe:r's intClpl'elatiOD seems to be
inadequate.
What causes the misw1derstaDding is Canfield and Gustavson's suggestion that
self-deception must be treated as a special case ofsdf-command. According to them, the
sufficient condition for ascribing 'self-command' is that somebody does something in me
face ofcertain obstacles, for example. one studies despite the disinclination to study (34).
Most likely, Gardiner thinks that Canfield and Gustavson arc saying lhat just as one can
make oneself study while being disinclined to study, so one can believe something while
being disinclined 10 believe iL Nevertheless. Canfield and Gustavson do not mention this
interpretation of'belief·advene circumstances: neither do they mention how their
interpretation follows from the supposed similarity bc:lween 'self-deception' and 'makiDg
oncselfto do something.' [{they would claim simply that they will presuppose tha1: 'seIC·
deception' means doing something in the face ofcertain obstacles. OM could acx:cpt it as a
heuristic device and examine whether this supposition adequately presents the meaning of
'sclf-.dcccption' in ordinary language. Nevertheless. Canfield and Gustavson claim that
they will treat self-deception as "a special case of self.command" (34). It seems to me
that if self-deception is a special case ofself-command, one should understand what is the
cOMection between self-oommand and self-deception. One should understand why
believing in something that is not warranted by evidence., that is to say. believing in
belief-adverse circumstances, should be considered as a special case of self-command
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For example, they must explain wba1 they UDderstaDd by the words 'do' aDd
'believe.' I can say thai in some sense to believe in belief-adverse cin:umswJces is to do
something. John says: "I believe in Santa Claus." Mary is sutpriscd: "00 you?"
Nevenheless., believing is cenainly not an action. It is posstble that believing could be
called an activity, but I think that one can equate this lcind of activity with an intentional
command. Meanwhile, Canfield and Gustavson's interpretation of self-command implies
an action: [ am doing something in the face ofcertain obstacles, for example. studying
despite tiredness (34). If'doing in the face ofcertain obstacles' is meant to imply an
action and believing in bclief·advene circw:nstaoce:s is 'a special case of self-command:
Canfield and Gustavson must say that believing in the face of evidence is an action too. I
can imagine only one sense in which 'believing' designates action. namely, in case when
'believing' is a shorter way orsaying 'making oneself believe something.' Hence. to say '[
believe in bclief-adverse circ:umstanoes' is to say that 'I make myselIbclieve in belicf-
adverse clIcumstaDCeS.' [think that this interpretation is the same paradoxical account of
'self-deception' that CanfieLd and Gustavson wants to refule. At the same time. if
Canfield and Gustavson want to ascribe 10 the word 'doing' a very broad sense, they will
end up with rather dubious examples of self-command. Mary who looks young despite
her age also does something in the face ofcertain obstacles. Nevertheless. I am reluctant
10 call this example an example of self-command.
Because ofcertain shoftcomings ofCanfield and GUSlavson's analysis., [ must
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agree with Herbert Fingarettc thai their definition of'self-deception' must be considered
on its own merits. ignoring the way they obtain this definition (Fingarette 22). At first, it
seems strange to suggest that one should analyse a definition ignoring the way it is
acquired. Nevertheless, onc must remember Demos whose definition oC'self-deception'
adequately presented the meaning of'self-deceptioo' despite the flaws in the method that
Demos used to acquire this definition. As in the case of Demos' definition, Canfield and
Gustavson's definition seerns to capture one aCme meanings that the concept 'self-
deeeption' has.
It seems that at least sometimes people mean by 'self-deception' nothing more
than ignorance nfthe obvious. For example, Jacques Denida says in an interview, "In all
the other disciplines [economics. sociology, the natural sciences, literature) you (Richard
Kearney] mention, there is philosophy. To say 10 oneself that onc is going to study
something thai is not philosopny is to deceive oneself' (Kearney 114). It is bard to see
what Oerrida would mean by this phrase except thai the imaginary student errs in his or
her thinking while it is quite obvious. according to Detrida. that any discipline has its
share of philosophy.
There are several philosophers who have provided similar examples. M. J. Scott-
Taggan. for example. says that "in everyday practice we frequently do use the falsity of
someone's beliefas a sufficient basis for a charge ofself deceit. One frequently hears
statements such as: "He is deceiving himselfifhe thinks I am going to visit herbccause
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he asked me 10, for I am oot6 (ll). Frederick Siegler tells the story about Brown whose
wife is unfaithful. Brown confides 10 his friend. White. that it seems that his wife's
friendship with her friend can lead ber to infidelity, and White says that Brown is
deceiving himselfifbc thinks that his wife is still failhfu.l. According to Siegler, 6White
is telling Brown that he has an erroneous belief, and he is implying that it is unreasonable
for Brown to have such a belief" (473). Similarly DOC can explain phrases like 1 am
deceiving myselfift think: I will win the race' or 'I am deceiving myself if I think I will
go to China this summer' (414). It seems that Scott.Taggart's and Siegler's examples
have shown that there is some truth in Canfield and Gustavson's definition.
Nevertheless, Canfield and Gustavson's definition of self-deception has provoked
rather severe criticism. Its critics argue that the condition ofbelief in belief-adverse
circumstances is not sufficient for defining self-deception. According to Penelhum and
Gardiner, self-deception defined as believing in belief-adverse circumstances is not
distinguishable from intellectual indecision, ignorance or stupidity (penelhwn 88), and
error, confusion, ignorance or foolishness (Gardiner 231). I must agree that they are right
in saying that Canfield and Gustavson's definition does not provide sufficient conditions
for ascribing 'self-deception' to someone, and the examples that Gardiner and Penelhwn
provide in a way indicate several problems with this definition, but I also must say that
their criticism has some flaws which for the sake of clarity should be mentioned.
First of all, one may vacillate between two different modes ofta1king about self-
3.
deception. [can talk about the term 'sclf-deception' and some phenomenon that is called
'self-deception.' I think: that DOt everything that can be said about a phenomena can be
said about the term that is ascribed to it. Canfield and Gustavson refer to both self-
deception and 'self-deception..' deception and 'deception; self-<:ommand and 'seLf-
command.' When they come to define self-deception, they seem to talk about the
phenomenon ofself-deception and not the concept. For example, they say, "All that
happens in self-deception. . is that the penon believes or forgets something in certain
circumstances" (35). And Gardiner suggests that if that is all that happens then onc
cannot distinguish self-deception from. for example, ignorance. In the case of ignorance
of certain evidence, ootbing really happens except that a person believes in some
proposition that is unwarranted. At the same time, he remarks that maybe there is no
clear distinction between foolishness and self-deception. because, "it is possible to cite
instances where saying of a person that he has deceived himself about a particular matter
seems to come down to asserting no more than that his judgement was mistaken and that
he should have known better" (231). Here Gardiner refers 10 Siegler's examples ofthe
usage oflhe expression 'to deceive onesetf (Siegler 473-474). So it seems that Gardiner
has 10 accept Canfield and Gustavson's definition after aU. He solves !he puzzle by
announcing Ihat ftsuch uses [lhe ones mentioned by Siegler] appear to be peripheral and
not to reflect !he cardinal features of !he conceplas DOrmally understoodft (231). As one
can notice, he has made a slip from talking about what happens in self-deception to what
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'self-deception'means. At first be talks about what happens in cases of self-deception;
late'[" he makes claims about what people auert when they usc the word 'self-deception.' I
think that Gardiner bas not noticed me ambiguity ofCanfield and Gustavson's
interpretation because of the similarity between their claims about self-deception and
Siegler's claims about the usage ofthe word 'self-deception.' In fact, it is rather possible
that they are claiming the same thing, but the ambiguity aCthe way philosophers express
their ideas does not allow one to be sure.
The differences between the two modes are imponant. [n order to illustrate what [
mean, I will use an example about the rising oftbe sun. [can say about the sun that it
rises. By 'rising' I mean that the sun goes up. Or if[ am more sophisticated 1would say
that the distance between the horizon and the sun increases. If I want to describe the
phenomenon that is called 'the rising ofthe sun' I would usually say that what happens is
that the earth rotates and because oflhis rolation my position with regard to the sun
changes. Using Canfield and Gustavson's phrase, all that happens when the sun rises is
that the earth rotates and my position with regard to the sun changes. Can I conclude that
when I say 'the sun rises' I mean to say that the earth rotates and my position with regard
to the sun changes? I think I cannot. First. my phrase about the sun's rising does not
analytically imply the rotation of the earth. and the fact that people some time ago did not
know that the earth rotates and,. nevertheless. used the phrase about the rising sun should
prove this claim; secondly, the meaning of the phrase in ordinary language docs not
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suggest the rotation oflhe sun. So it seems to me that the distinction between the
phenomenon (aU that: happens) and the meaning oflhe term must be made. Ofcourse, the
ignoring ofthis distinction will not always cause misunderstandings. It does not seem to
Maner whether [define the word 'grasshopper' or describe the particular insect.
Meanwhile. I think that in the case of'self-deception' the distinction between the meaning
oflhe concept and the phenomenon that ibis concept is attached to must be made.
I agree that self-deception as it is defined by Canfield and Gustavson cannot be
distinguished from the case ofa person who is ignorant about evidence: be or she
believes in some proposition while the belief in the proposition is in fact unwarranted. Or
somebody can be confused and not understand the evidence; eveD such a state ofcon-
fusion would nol be distinguishable from self-deception, ifself-deception is just a belief
in belief-adverse circumstances. Meanwhile, ifonc looks at the concepts of'stupidity,'
'confusion,' 'ignorance,' or 'enor,' none of them can be defined as 'believing in spite of
evidence that does not warram lhe belief.' So. one cannot substitute the sentence 'John
deceives himself wilh sentences (ike 'John is stupid' or 'John is a fooL' By 'stupidity' and
'foolishness' one usually means certain personal characteristics that display lhemselves in
beliefs. reasoning or actions. Certainly, Derridacould say lhatthose who think that they
will study sociology but in so doing will not study philosophy are stupid. meaning that a
person with minimal capacities of thinking should have arrived at such a lhought. Maybe
Derrida could have said that, but he does not. He says that philosophy is incorporated in
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sociology and natural sciences and some persons do not see that.
Nevertheless, I think that the examples provided by Gardiner and Penelhum are
interesting, because it seems that when people say that one has deceived oneself they
imply something more than the fact that one has an unwarranted belier For example,
they are not implying that one has unwarranted beliefbecause 0/ignorance. Penelhwn
claimed lhat the self-deceiver must know the evidence because otherwise the state of self-
deception would be indistinguishable liom ignorance (88). And it seems that 'deceiving
oneself usually implies that one knows the evidence. I very well know why I will not go
to China, and I know why my chances ofwinning the race are slim. By saying that one
possesses evidence I do not mean to imply that one who deceives ooeselfnecessary
realizes the ttuth to wh.ich the evidence is pointing. There is no extra research necessary
for somebody to realize: that philosophy is part ofevery discipline. but the panicular
person might not realize that what be or she knows about natural sciences or sociology is
evidence for the presence of philosophy in these disciplines.
Penelhum's objection, which is also presented by Gardiner (Gardiner 231), cannot
be an objection against Canfield and Gustavson's interpretation of self-deception. They
claim that Jones deceives himself when he believes in some proposition in belief·adverse
circumstances, and the belief-adverse circumstances are such that the evidence that Jones
has does not warrant the belief (34). The evidence that Jones has' seems to imply that
Jones is aware of the evidence. Meanwhile, Penelhum's criticism can be applied neither
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to Siegler's nor Scott-Taggart's interpretation ofwhat it means to say that one has
deceived oneself. They both claim that phrases like 'Jobn deceives himself' mean nothing
more than the fact that John bas unwammted belief. Neilber have mentioned that 'to
deceive oneself implies knowledge of evidence. and I think they should have.
like ignorance. stupidity does not seem to fit people that deceive themselves. I
doubt that somebody would say that, for example, John is deceiving himself if the person
thinks that John is stupid. foolish or mentally ill. lfSiegler's ioterprelation seems to
exclude the possibility that John is naive or foolish., onc cannot say the same about Scott-
Taggart's or Canfield and Gustavson's interpretations. Siegler bas noticed that when one
says about oneself'l am deceiving myself or one claims that somebody else is deceiving
himselfor herself, thenane usually implies that "r should have known better, but I did
not" or "he ought Co know (have known) better" (474). I know that there is DO chance to
win the race; nevertheless, r believe that I will win, while I sbould have abandoned this
belief because it is unwarranted. Brown knows that his wife more and more often is
going on business trips logether with her friend; nevertheless. be thinks that sbe is faithful
to him while he sbould have realized that she is nOI. I think that here 'sbould' and 'ought'
mean thaI the person who ascribes self- deception to somebody presumes that the penon
in question is capable ofhaving arrived at the appropriate conclusion. White, who
ascribes self-deception 10 Brown. expects something from Brown. While thinks that
Brown is capable ofcoming 10 the conclusion that bis wife is unfaithful but he does oot.
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Persons who believe that they will study the natwal sciences without studying philosophy
are capable ofcoming to the right conclusion but they do not. Usually I believe
something only whcn my belief seems warranted. but this time I believe something that is
not warranted. [fsaying that one deceives onesclfnecessarily implies that one is capable
of either believing or not believing in belief-adverse circumstances. then I can explain
why 'deception ofoneselr is not ascribed to mentally ill. stupid, or naive persons. and
why it is not ascribed to children or persons that are just confused. One does not expect
ofchildren, stupid or confused persons that they will ~ize the evidence which is against
their beliefs.
Jeffrey foss has provided one more objection against Canfield and Gustavson's
analysis of self-deception. He criticizes Canfield and Gustavson for allowing the
poSSibility that a self-deceiver is right (238). It is possible to imagine a situation when
one believes in something despite the evidence against one's beliefand the belieftums
out 10 be correct. Of course, ifit turns out that Brown's wife, despite her many business
trips in company ofthe mend, is still faithful 10 Brown, one would DOt correclly say thaI
Brown has deceived himself.
In order to justify the claim thai 'belief in belief·adverse circumslances' is not an
acceptable definilion for 'self-deception: Foss shows that a beJief~in!he face ofadverse
evidence" can be true (238). Ifsuch a belief can be true, one cannot say that the person
who has such a belief is deceiving himselfor herself. To prove bisclaim, Foss uses an
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example ofSmith and Jooes who have fallen overboard quite far from the shore. Both
Smith and Jones know on the basis of their experience that they are not good swimmers
and both somehow believe that they will reach the shore. Smith succeeds, but Jones docs
not. Both believed in belief-adverse circumstances and, therefore, conform to the
requirements of self-deception as lhey are presented by Canfield and Gustavson.
Nevertheless. Smith cannot be sclf-deceived because his beliefwas correcL So it seems
that Canfield and Gustavson's conditions ofself-deception are not sufficient
As Foss has recognized, one way to avoid his objection is to announce that in
order for ODC to be sclf-deceived the belief that one holds in belief-adverse circumstances
must be false. Foss claims that such a condition would be introduced ad hoc just to save
the defInition. According 10 Foss, the real problem with this definition is thaI it presents
self-deception only as discrepancy between a beliefand evidence. Foss claims thai
Canfield and Gustavson have forgotten a necessary aspect of self-deception, namely, the
duplicity "with its implications ofduality and deceit" (238).
I think that such a condition would not be an ad hoc condition. When somebody
applies the concept ofself--deception to a person whose belief is correct, [would say that
the concept is simply used incorrectly. For example. I can imagine that somebody named
Wilson watches from the boat Smith and Jones struggling to get to the shore and says that
if they believe that they will make it they are deceiving themselves. I think that wbat
Wilson wants to say is that for him it seems obvious that Smith and Jones will not reach
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the shore and they are mistaken when they believe that they will. Since Smith in fact
reaches the shore, Wilson is mistaken in evaluating Smith's capacities and his words
about Smith deceiving birnselfwere unered mistakenly.
One might be tempted to conclude that in ordinary language to ascnDe seLf-
deception to someone is to say thaI (1) Ite orsbc believes in some proposition that is
unwarranted by evidence, (2) the person knows the evidence, (3) he or she is capable to
adjusting this belieflo evidence. and (4) lhe proposition in which thtperson believes is
false. Nevertheless. [ want to claim that these conditions are not conditions for ascribing
to someone the tenn 'self-deception.' I think these four conditions that seem to depict the
meaning aCthe term 'self-deception' in fact describe one oflhe meanings aClhe
expression 'to deceive oneself.'
2.2.3 'Self-Deception' and Biased Believing
Consider the ronawing examples: 'He thinks I am going to visit her because he
asked me to - that is a typical case ofself-deception;' 'Some students think that ODC can
study the natural sciences wilhout studying philosophy, but they are self-deceived;' 'Jones
thinks that he will reach !he shore: - how can one be so self-deceived?' I have a certain
feeling that the meaning ofthese senlences has changed as compared to the instances
when the expression 'to deceive oneself' is used to report that somebody's belief is
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unwarranted.
In order to show that there is a difference between the use of'self-dcc:eption' and
that of'deceiving oneself: let me usc another example. [am retumiDg to the story about
Brown, While and Brown's wife woo is unfaithful to Brown. I can imagine that Brown
watches bis wife leaving for the customary business trip and says to his friend White:
'You know, I still believe she is faithful to me, but probably I amjustdeceiving myself.'
And the friend agrees: 'Probably you are.' Would one say in this situation that Brown is a
self-deceiver or that he is in the stale of self-deception? [think one would not. Ifone
knows that Brown realizes that his belief may be incorrect, one would not say that Brown
IS a self-<iceeiver.7 So White can say about Brown that Brown is deceiving himself. but
he cannot say that Brown is self-deceived.
IfI am right, the expression 'to deceive oneself' when it is used to designate belief
in be[ief~adverse circumstances cannot be substituted with the term 'self-deception.'
Canfield and Gustavson. Siegler and Scott-Taggart have described one ofthe meanings of
the expression '10 deceive oneself' and not the meaning of the term. 'self-deception.'
Meanwhile, [do not want to say that the expression 'to deceive oneself' can never be used
10 replace the lerm 'self.-deception.' If the mother ofthe boy who is cruel 10 animals
makes herselfbelieve what she knows is faJse, namely, that he is not cruel 10 animals, I
1 In the example, I used the expression 1 still believe' to emphasize the possibility
that one can believe something even ifone entertains a thought that the belief could be
faJse. Tbeawareness ofthe possibility to be mistaken need not undermine the belief.
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could say about her-both that she presents an instance ofsetf-deceptioo and that she is
deceiving herself. Only in lhis case my claim about me person would imply more than
just belief in belief-adverse circumstances. I am claiming that the mother has done
something in order 10 have such unwarranled belief. Ofcouzsc:. it is hard to see the
difference ifone is presented with one sentence like 'Jones is deceiving himself.' It seems
to me that one can tell which meaning is used in a particular sentence only ifonc knows
or presupposes the context in which the phrase is ascribed 10 somebody.
[ think I have shown that 'to deceive oneself can be used in a sense that is
different from any meaning aCthe lean 'self-deception.' Meanwhile, I have not shown yet
what the difference is. Brown believes that his wife is stiU faithful while it is clear for
everybody around that she is not. [t certainly seems that unless Brown announces that he
thinks his belief could be false, one could say that Brown is self-deceived, or that Brown
is in the state of self-deception. The question is what one would mean by saying that
Brown is self-deceived
first. it seems that as in the cases when one uses the expression 'to deceive
oneself,' one would ascribe to Brown a certain false beliefin spite oftbe evidence of
which. Brown is aware. but does not recognize as evidence against his belief. It is more
difficult to say whetberone would claim that Brown is capable ofadjusting his beliefto
evidence. One would not say that Brown is stupid or mentally ill, so in some sense
Brown is capable ofadjusting his beliefs. Nevertheless, it seems to me that when one
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says that Brown is self-deceived. one is claiming that something bas gone seriously
wrong with Brown's capacities 10 recognize the discrepancy between his beliefand the
evidence.
[ also think WI by ascnbing to Brown self-deception. one is suggesting tbat there
is some mentaJ cause for Brown's incapacity to recognize the implications ofevidence for
his belief. When one is saying thai Brown is sclf-deccived. one most likely thinks that
Brown's wish that his wife would be faithful somehow influences his capacity to eva!ullle
correclly the evidence. While in this case the influence is exerted by the wish, on other
occasions. the belief may be influenced by something else. For example, Wallet Raleigh
writes about the men ofShakespeare'5 plays that Mlhcir imagination often masters and
disables them" (175). He adds, "Self-deception. it would seem. is a male weakness"
(175). Here some preconceived and imagined understanding of how things are under-
mines one's capacity to judge objectively. According to Raleigh. Macbeth "sees the
murder as a single incident in the moving history ofhuman woe" and fails to understand
the practical aspects and consequences ofms actions.
If Plato's use ofth.e lenn 'self-deception' is 10 be related to some meaning !be lerro
h.as in contemporary English. I think his interpretation must be mentioned here. Plato
uses !be teon 'self-deception' to denote a certain failure ofreasoning, and the precon-
ceived and imagined understanding ofhow things arc certainly can undennine one's
capacity 10 judge things objectively and can resull in a failure or reasoning. One can be
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carried away by one's thoughts and. interpreting evidence as supporting one's precon-
ceived ideas, fail to notice lbe obvious.
[ lhink [ can try 10 define the meaning of'self-deception' which the term has in
ordinary language and which. is oot paradoxicaL Sometimes when one ascnbcs to
somebody self-deception, one is claiming that (I) lhe person is in a certain state ofmind
that causes the person 10 falsely believe something that is not warranted. by evidence. (2)
the state ofmind can be characterised as being biased by some wish, presupposition or
interest, (3) and the person is not aware aCthe bias. and whenever ODC realizes that the
belief is biased, one ceases to be in the state ofself-deception.
One can notice the difference between this non-paradoxical understanding of'self-
deception' and the paradoxical. that is. making oneselfbelieve something one knows is
false. Neither the coodition of'making: i.e., some action, nor the condition ortwa
contradictory beliefs can be ascribed to the non-paradoxical meaning of'self-deccptioo'
that shortly can be characterized as biased believing. The term 'self-deception' lIlal is
used 10 designate biased believing is also distinguishable from the expression 'to deceive
oneself that is used 10 designate unwarranted belief. The fanner designates a specific
stale ofmind thai is characterized by a wish or interest that causes the person 10 have a
false belief, while the laUer indicates only a discrepancy between one's belief and evj.
dence one has. The meaning of'deceive oneself does not require the absence ofaware·
ness about one's state ofmind. and it need oot require the presence of interest or wish that
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biases the evidence. Ifstudents who raIsely believe that there is DO philosophy in the
natural sciences are in the state of self-deception. they must want philosopby to be absent
and their want should bias the evidence. The students, ofcourse, could be in such a state;
nevertheless, I doubt that Derrida would claim that they are. Mon:: likely be is just saying
thatstudentscrr.
2.3 Other Alternatives to the Paradoxical Meaning
[ have pinned down two meanings lbat 'self-deception' has in ordinal)' language.
To describe them briefly, 'self-deception' can eitbermean a biased believing (the 000-
paradoxical meaning of'self-deception') or making oneselfbelievc what one knows is
false (the paradoxical meaning of'sclf-deception). I have also described some confusion
with the definition of'self-deception' as unwarranted belief. Now one could ask whether
[have described all the meanings that 'self-deception' has. It, cenainly, does not seem so.
For example. I can say that Fingarettcdoes not accept the definition of'self-
deception' as making oneselfbelieve what one knows is false, because he claims that
paradoxes arise from the characterization ofsclf-deception in terms ofbelier and knowl~
edge (Self-Deception 34). II seems that he does not accept the idea that 'self-deception'
means nothing more than biased believing, because he claims that a self-deceiver
persuades himselfto believe contrary to the evidence and that Rthe self-deceiver purpose~
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fully brings it about that he is deceived" (Self-Deception 28.31). At the same lime be
says that "the self-dec:eiver is one who is in some way engaged in the world but who
disavows the engagement, who will not acknowledge it even to himselfas his" ("Self-
Deception" 81). Should one understand this phrase as a definition oClhe concept 'self-
deception'? [[so, it is definitely not a definition thatdescnbes the usage aCthe word in
ordinary language. [would be very surprised ifsomebody who is not familiar with
philosophical analysis of self-deception would say: "What is self-deception? [don't
know. Well, [ guess it's a disavowal ofooe's engagement in the world." But ifone
allows Fingarette's definition to be a stipulative definition oflhe concept. then one can
feel embarrassed when asked about other definitions thai do not match eitheroflhe two
ordinary language definitions, neither the paradoxical nor the non-paradoxical one.
15 Audi's definition MOlber stipulative definition? He says that a self-deceiver
unconsciousLy knows some proposition, while sincerely avowing lhe negation ofthis
proposition and the person has at least one want that explains why lhe person is in such a
slate (173). In ordinary language., people do Dot call anyone a self-deceivCI" meaning that
the person unconsciously knows one thing but avows another. For example., one can
compare the following versions ofa statement about self-deception: 'Jones still believes
that Mary will marry him, but he knows that she will not. How can one be so self-
deceived?' and 'Jones still avows that Mary will marry him, but he unconsciously knows
that she will not. How can one be so self-deceived?' I doubt that anybody asked to
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explain what be or she means by 'self-deception' would use the second interpretation.
Nevertheless, it is very possible that ifasked to explain bow it is possible that one
believes in one thing while knowing that the opposite is the case, one would claim that
Jones unconsciously knows that Mary will not marry him. One could say that the
ordinary language speaker assumed the unconscious knowledge in the first case but
expressed the meaning imprecisely. [cannot provide cooclusive evidence that such
interpretation is wrong. but personally I believe that reference to unconscious knowledge
is used as a way to explain the apparent paradox which a person recognizes only after the
question about knowing I1OI·p and believingp isasJced. [fone would ask the person what
he or she means by unconscious knowledge, the most probable answer will be that there
are better things to do in the world than answer silly questions. And I think that the
inability to explain what one means by the term 'self-deception' does not imply that one
does nol know what 'self-deception' means, it rather implies that one does not really mean
anything other than believing one lbing and knowing the opposite at the same time. Only
when chalJenged, does one realize the paradoxical nature of the interpretation.
So I would say !hat neither Fingarene nor Audi has presented the definition of the
meaning that the Ienn 'self-deception' has in ordinary language. One can continue this list
ofdefinitions that will not match the definitions ofocdinary language.1 There are many
who do not try to define self-deception and whose interpretation of'self-deception' seems
I See. for example, Rorty's definition ("Deceptive Self' 25), or McLaughlin's (51-
52), or Harold A. Sackeim and Ruben C. Gur's (150), or W. J. Talbott (30).
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to be different from the two [have desmDed. The reader should not misunderstand mc. I
am not claiming that the right way to define a concept is to provide tbedefinition oCthe
meaning that the concept has in ordinary language. Also. I am not trying to reject the
definitions o[philosopben: lbat are not consistent with the meaning oftbc term in
ordinary language. I am trying to clarify for myselfwby there is such a variety of
definitions ofself-dc:ceptioo. In order to answer this question I am trying to establish
wbether the defutition some philosopher bas provided corresponds to the meaning that
the word bas in ordinary language. [fit does not, then the only conclusion is that the
panicular philosophers has his own undemanding of what self-deception is. And my
conclusion is that there are quite a few different definitions provided by philosophers
none ofwhich correspond to ordinary language.
I could conclude that some definitions aClhe concept 'self-deception' report the
usage of the term 'self-deception' in ordinary language. and all the other definitions are
different stipulative definitions. Unfortunately, such a position would leave me with
some unanswered questions. Ifone will allow for many definitions to be stipulative defi·
nitions. then the discussion ofself-deception seems to be impossible: everybody dis-
cusses something else. Meanwhile, it does not seem. like the discussion ofself-deception
IS completely incoherent. So what is going on? I think that in order to answer this
question I must look again at Audi's analysis of self-deception.
Robert Audi starts his article "Self-Deception and Rationality" by listing a number
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ofproblems concerning self-deception lhat have puttIed philosophers. He announces.,
"This paper is based on the view that despite these difficulties the concept of self·
deception is both explicable without paradox and useful in understanding persons" (169).
He continues with a story about Othello and Iago as an example of interpersonal self·
deception {I 70). As everybody knows, Iago deceived Othello. Now Audi wants to
enlel1am a possibility that Othello is deceiving himself. According to Audit Othello is
attracted to Emilia. but. being a faithful husband of Desdemona, makes himselfbclieve
that he is not attracted and the attraction is gone. Audi announces that the example of
Othello cannot be an example ofself-deception because self-deception "apparently
exhibits .. both deceiver and deceived" and must include "a Itind ofduality" (111).
Othello has none of these. his attraction and his beliefthat be is attracted to Emilia are
gone. Audi continues by declaring that any account of self-deception must "speak to" the
interpretation ofself-deception that assumes lhal a self-deceiver believes something that
he or she knows is not true, and Audi proposes his own account (l72.)'3). Audi thinks
that a person "is in self-deception" wben he or she unconsciously knows some proposi.
tion, while sincerely avows the negation of this proposition and has at least one want that
explains why the person is in such a state (173). Audi attempts to demonstrate the cor·
rectness of his account with a rather lengthy explanation of bow Othello could be self·
deceived (173·177). Audi writes,
He [Othello] not only exhibits embarrassment around Emilia, but lavishes
unusual attention on Desdemona at the earliest opportunity thereafter and
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protests too much both regarding his attraction to Desdemona and con-
cerning his immunity to the cbanns ofEmilia (17S).
Audi remarks that his account "is meant to apply 10 paradigm cases, and it may
not caprute all the cunent admissible uses of'self-deception'" (173). I am not sure what
Audi means by 'admissible uscs,' but his definition certainly does not capture any of the
current uses of'sclf-deception.' [have not read any otherphiJosopher that would use an
identical interpretation of'self-deception: and so one caonot say that his definition
depicts 'self-deception' as it is used in philosophical discourse. And as I demonstrated.
his definition does not reflect 'self-deception' in ordinary language either.
Audi's claims that self-deception 'apparently exhibits both deceiver and deceived'
and presupposes 'a kind ofduality' seem to suggest that he could subscribe to the usual
paradoxical definition of'self-deception,' namely, making oncsclfbclieve what one
knows is false. If that is lrUc then it is not clear what Audi's definition defines. [doubt
that he would say that he uses both 'self-deception' ofordinary language and a stipulative
definition at the same time. h is clear that there is some connection between the two, but
I doubt that Audi would say that by the word 'self-deception' he understands a state in
which somebody knows p and believes not·p as well as the state in which one uneon·
sciously knows p and consciously avows not·p. Rather he would say that if the term 'self·
deception' makes some sense. it must be understood in terms of unconscious knoWledge
and sincere avowals.
So what happens to the ordinary language understanding of'self-<l.eception' of
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wttich Audi seems to be aware? Audi promises to analyse the concept and claims that he
b.as done so. Nevenheless., it seems 10 me that meanwhile he has switched from an
analysis oftbe concept to an explanation ofself-deception, i.e., the phenomenon that is
called 'self-deception: and he claims that self-deception as a phenomenon is after aU not
paradoxical (172). His claim seems 10 be that the phenomenon ofself..<fcception seems
paradoxical at the first sight. but in fact is nothing more than unconscious knowledge and
sincere avowals. Similarly one could switch from talking about the meaning ofthe words
'the sun rises' 10 talking about what really happens in the moming when 'the sun rises.'
All that bappens is that the earth rotates and the place where [stand is exposed to the sun.
How could such a switch happen unnoticed? I think: that the reason for this is the
fact that someone who knows how 10 usc a word need not know how to state the meaning
of it. Let me look at some examples. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty starts her article "1be
Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers. and Lairs" with a rather lengthy example ofa cancer
specialist who seem not to notice her symptoms ofcancer and displays strange
behaviours that suggest that she Icnows that she has cancer, for example. she writes a will.
The example is introduced with the words: "Ifanyone is ever self-deceived. Dr. Laetitia
Androvna is that person" (12). A philosopher who denies the possibility oflitera1 self-
deception, Mary Haight, also knows when the word 'self-deception' must be used. She
mentions, for example, a man who may have cancer, ignoring his symptoms or
explaining them away, and a doting mother, blind to her son's faults in ways that do not
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really seem possible (vii). Audi also knows when the word is applied. When after
providing the definition of'sclf-deception,' Audi presents the example of Othello, he
wants 10 provide an example that would show that his interpretation of'self-deccption' is
possible. The interesting thing is that his Othello would indeed be called a self-deceivcr
in everyday language. even by those that have DOt read Audi's article and would not use
the word in the sense that Audi does. So it seems that when philosopben explain what
self-deception they hac explained not so much the concept ofselfdeception as some
phenomena 10 which the concept to which the concept 'self-deception' is usually
ascribed. r tl1ink that they connect the meaning of self-deception with a certain panem of
behaviour. Dr. Laetitia Androvna denies that she has cancer and seems 10 do this
sincerely while some oCher behaviour suggests that she knows she has cancer, for
example, she writes her will. Othello avows that be is oot interested in Emilia. but his
behaviour suggests that be is interested in ber and knows thaI. He 'exhibits
embarrassment.' Should one say then that the term 'self-deception' is meant to designate
ccnain behaviour?
[doubt that the word 'self-deception' means only certain Icinds ofbcbaviour. I
would rather agree with Audi that the word 'self-deception' is an explanatory cOl1Cept that
implies an explanation ofbow certain behaviour is possible (189-191). When one claims
that Jones is sclf-deceived. one does not just claim that Jones acts like hc knows what he
claims nOI to know, instead onc claims that Jones in fact knows thc truth. Ofcourse,
5.
when Audi talks about such a cooccpl be uses his own version ofwhat 'self-deception'
means. but it scans to me that 'sdf4eccption' in ordinary language rqwt:sCDts an
c:xpLanatoryconccpt. When I see that a motba"claims that her son is a good boy and
seems to do it sincerely, but ( have good reasons to believe that she knoWilhat her son is
not a good boy, since she bas seen him killing bumblebees. I am explaining the behaviour
arthis mother. [am stating., corTeCtly or wrongly, that she knows that the boy is bad. but
makes herselfbelieve that he is not. And whenever it seems to me that I can explain in
this way some behaviour (like ignoring or denying obvious things, or behaving in strange
ways), I am saying that one has made oneselfbelieve what one knows is faJse. I am
saying that the person is self-deceived.
The good thing about this explanation is that it looks plaustble. It looks plausible
that the mother knows that her son is a bad boy and believes that be is good at the same
time. The bad thing about this explanati.on is that it docs not survive any analysis. While
the wocds 'know,' 'believe' and 'make' stay as they are. tbeexplanation seems meaningful.
When philosophers tty to analyse this explanation, lhey quickly get into troUble. F(K"
example, what do 'know' and 'believe' mean in this explanation? 'Consciously know' and
'consciously believe'? If the answer is 'yes,' how is such self.-dcceprion possible?
[ should not be surprised about the obscurity of everyday language. I can remind
the reader ofthe example that I used for showing the distinction between the meaning of
a concept and the description ofa phenomenon. namely, the phrase 'the sun rises..'
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Surprisingly, when I think about what exactly I mean by saying that the sun rises, [ soon
get into different kinds of problems. The first interpretation tbal comes to my mind is 'the
sun goes up.' Do I mean that the sun moves in the upward direction? Not really. I can
try to define the meaning by saying that the distance between the sun and the horizon
increases. Do I mean lhat me distance between the star Sun and the horizon increases?
Not really. Do [want to describe my perceptual field and lhe position between the bright
spot in my perceptual field, the sun, and the horizon? Maybe that is what I am doing, but
the meaning ofthe phrase 'the sun rises' does DOt suggest this interpretation. Alii am
saying is that the SUD 'goes up,' and I do not really think about what exactly this phrase
The problem with sentences like 'the sun is rising' and 'somebody believes what
he or she knows is false' is that tlIere is something convincing in these phrases. l can
understand that somebody bas reasons for saying that the sun rises. And I can understand
that there are some reasons why one wants to say that the penon believes what he or she
knows is false. Why does a cancer specialist deny that she bas cancer when the evidence
is obvious? Why does she write her will, ifshe thinks that she bas no cancer? Why does
Othello reacts so strangely when be is near Emilia? One way ofdealing with the problem
is to ascribe to the word 'know' a vet}' broad or very specific meaning. As Paluch bas
indicated. philosophers like Freud and Demos do not talk: about knowing in the ordinary
sense ofthe word and talk: about unconscious and latent knowing (270). The same is true
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of Audi, for example. Other philosophers would claim that my knowledge that p and my
believing that not-p an:: somebow separated in my mind (see. fur example. Rorty ~Self­
Deception" 130-131, King-Farlow 135, Davidson "Deception" 91·92, Sackeim and Our
188, Pears "Goals" 76-77). Often philosophers would simply deny that the person really
knows p when he or she believes oot-p (see, for example. Paluch 275-276, Baghramian
"Paradoxes" In-I?3, Mele Irrationality 127, Siegler471472). And some would say
that die self-dcceiver does not really believe what tie or she claims to believe (for
example, Haigbt A Study lOS, Kipp 261).
The question ofwbether self-deceivers know what they seem to know and
whether their knowing is conscious or unconscious are only some oftbc questions that
can be asked and are asked about self-deception. For example, one can ask whether the
mother makes hersclfbelieve in her son's virtue. The ordinary language meaning of'self-
deception' seems to imply thai the mother actively and intentionally chooses to believe
one lhing while knowing that the opposite is true. Ofcourse, this description ofwhal
happens in cases ofself-deception sounds paradoxical. How can one do anything like
making onesclfbelieve what one knows is false? Again., philosopbers have taken
different attitudes IOwards this question. Some philosophers deny any active biasing of
beliefs (see, for example, Kipp 261, Jobnson 152). And many suggest that the beliefs are
biased but the biasing docs Dot have the fonn of making oneselfbclieve wbat one knows
is false, unless there is some special sense of'knowing' and 'believing' (For example,
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Davidson "Deception" 88, Fingarettc Se/f-lJe£eption 4748, Mclaughlin SI, Mele
Irrationality 127, Paluch 276).
It is also interesting 10 distinguish two different methods that philosophers use
when they want to provide some explanation for behaviour that is associated with the
tenn'self-deception.' There iIIe some pbilosopbcr5 who take concrete examples ofself-
deception and tty to explain what happens in the mind of the person who ignores
something obvious or displays a behaviour that suggests certain knowledge ofthe facts
that the person denies (see Rorty "The Deceptive Self," Haight A Study afSelf-Decep-
tion). These philosophers usually start their analysis with panicular examples ofJohns
and Marys who usually would be called self-deceivers. and the aim oftbe analysis is to
show that the behaviour of these people. such as, denying obvious things, is explainable
without using any paradoxical suggestions about knowing and not knowing or making
one self-believe what cannot be believed. Other philosopbers try to model what could
happen in a self-deceiver's mind that would resemble these paradoxical interpretations
(see, for example, Audi "SeIf·Deception and Rationality," TaJbott "IntentionaJ Self-
Deception in a Single Coherent Self," Davidson "Deception and Division"). These
philosophers usually concentrate on models ofdefective rationality.
Ofcourse, the result of many interpretations and different approaches is different
definitions of self-deception. But what is common among them? Why do all philos-
ophers claim that they have defined self-deception? Why do so many different definj·
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[jons come under ODe name? I think that the answer is simple. 'The common thing is
philosophers' aim. to explain the strange behaviour tbat usually associates with the
ordinaJy language term 'self~tion: They refuse the explaDation of that behaviour
suggested by the meaning or'self-deceptioo' as it is used in ordinary language, and try 10
substitute for it their own interpretation.
[ lbink that [ have been able to explain how the word 'self-deception' is used in
ordinary language and why there arc 50 many different definitions aCtbe term in the
philosophical literature on self-deception. I must say that the process ofclarification has
been quite painstaking which implies the confusion in the use oftbe term. I think: that
lhis confusion is caused by various abuses aCtbe onfuwy langua~word in philosophical
discourse. [t seems to me that the analysis ofdiffcn:nt problems that come under the
name ofself~ODwould be much clearer ifpbHosopbcrs would try to label these
problems with their own names, such as., 'imltiooaI behaviour' or 'motivated biasing of
beliefs.' Persooally. I wiU no( follow my own advise and use the term, and the next
chapler is meant to analyse the possibility ofdeliberate self-deception.
3.0 lS DELIBERATE SELF·DECEPTION POSSlBLE?
Before [proceed to answer this question., [think I need to clarify some of the
concepts that J am using. In the first two sections ofthis chapter, [will tty to explain my
understanding ofthe concept 'deliberate self.deception' and the nature oftbe problem that
my question is inlended to present. J think that such an introduction will help the reader
to understand bener the analysis of the possibility ofdeliberate self.deception that [give
in the remaining sections of the chapter.
In Section 3.1, I explain my undmtanding ofdeliberate action. Deliberate action
is an action that is preceded by a state of intending. In Section 3.2, J present deliberate
self-deception as a type ofdeliberate action. I confine the meanings of the term 'self-
deception' to one meaning that the term has in ordinary language. I think that 'making
oneselfbeJieve what one knows is false' is the meaning of'self-deceprion' that could
allow the possibility ofself-deception as deliberate action and that is related to my
interest in the possibility ofcontrolling one's mind. [define deliberate self·deception as
an action of making oneselfbelieve what one knows is false that is preceded by intending
to make oneselfbelieve what one knows is false. The remaining sections are meant to
analyse a possibility of such self.deception. In Section 3.3, I distinguish between two
kinds of deliberate actions: basic actions and non-basic actions. A basic action is a
deliberate action that does not need additional deliberate actions for its realization.
65
Deliberate self-deception as a basic action consists ofmaking oneselfbelievc what one
knows is false without intending any other action than making oneselfbelieve what one
knows is false, for example., without intending to forget evidence for something one
knows. I argue that deliberate self-deception as a basic action is impossi.ble, because
there is no basic action of making oneselfbelieve something, for example. believe that p.
Since deliberate self-deception requires making oncselfbelieve thatp, there cannot be
deliberate self-deception as a basic action. In Section 3.4, I consider the possibility of
deliberate self-deception as a non-basic action, that is, as an action that requires for its
realization some additional deliberate action. In the first part of the section (3.4.1), I
show that in order to make oneselfbelieve what one knows is false. DOC has to undermine
one's explicit and conscious knowledge nfthe falsity oftbe proposition which one wants
to believe. In the second part nfthe section (3.4.2), I examine the possibility of realizing
deliberate self-deception by forgetting, wbich is a deliberate non-basic action. Deliberate
self-deception is making oneselfbelieve what one knows is false; and in order 10 realize
deliberate self..o.eception, the self-deceiver can try 10 WKiennine bis or ber knowledge of
the falsity of some proposition p by trying to forget either !hatp is false or the evidence
that supports the knowledge thatp is false. In the third part of the section (3.4.3), [
examine the possibility of realizing deliberate self-deception by deliberately reinterpret-
ing the evidence for the falsity ofp.
3.1 Deliberate and Intentional Actions
Usually, the word 'deliberate' specifies the nature ofsome action. For example,
'John deliberately stepped on the banana skin. Sometimes the word 'deliberate' looks like
it characterizes not an action but some state or event. For example, 'John made a
deliberate error.' [think that such. an expression is meant to describe the way the
particular state or event h.as come about, namely, the action that bas brought it about, and
'deliberate' here is not used 10 denote some intrinsic property of the state or event. At
least, I cannot imagine what kind of intrinsic property that would be.
Usually, the word 'deliberate' can be replaced with the word 'intentional.' For
example. 'John intentionally stepped on the banana skin.' For reasons that are unknown
to me, philosophers prefer the word 'intentional,' which they sometimes substitute with
the word 'deliberate.' I bave not found a philosopher who would try to distinguish
between the use ofthe terms 'intentional action' and 'deliberate action,' and in practice the
use of these tenus does not differ in any noticeable manner.'
The word 'deliberate,' according to the OED, originates from the Latin word libra.
to balance. Hen: one could search. for some differences between 'deliberate' and
'intentional' because the latter does not suggest anything that in any sense resembles
9 See, for example. Donald Davidson ("Deception" 86), Jerome A. Shaffer (78),
Samuel Guttenplan (559), Lawrence H. Davis ("Action" 112·113).
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balancing. Meanwhile, the verb 'to deliberate' usually is explained as a weighing ofrea-
sons or evidence. So it could be tempting to suggest that 'deliberate action' is an action
that follows, or results from, deliberatioD. Since DOt aU intentional actions are preceded
by deliberation, one could use the condition ofdeliberation to distinguish between
'deliberate' and 'intentional' actions. For example. I suddenly ootice a silverfish running
on my bathroom floor and I step on it with the purpose ofsmashing it - I have stepped on
it intentionally; but since before my action I did not weigh the reasons for and against my
stepping on the silverfish, I have not perfonned a deliberate action. Ofcourse, the
distinction I just portrayed is concocted and does not correspond to the way the tenns
'intentional action' and 'deliberate action' are used in philosophical literature or ordinary
language. Both in phiJosopbicalliterature and ordinary language the action [describe
would be called a deliberate action. I saw the silverfish and intentionally stepped on it;
and even iff did nol deliberate on my future action. I did it deliberately.
The only difference [can notice between the uses of'intentional' and 'deliberale' is
lhat in ordinary language the word 'deliberate' is usually ascribed to intentional actions
lhat are considered to be condemnable, and usually such actions are condemnable because
they are intentional. Thus, to accuse me ofan act ofcruelty, someone would, first ofall,
insist that r stepped on the silverfish deliberately; while to defend myselfagainst such
accusations, I would claim. that I stepped on it unintentionally or by accident.
I doubt that philosophers think about blameworthy actions when they write about
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deliberate control or deliberate coughing (Shaffer 78, Guttenplan 559). In the philosophy
ofmind, the aspect ofblame is somehow lost. My suggestion for an analysis of the
possibility ofdeliberate self-deception is not meant to imply blameworthy actions either.
So [propose 10 ignore this aspect of the meaning. But before I explain what I call a
deliberate action and deliberate self-deception, I want to say some words about the ways
philosophers have interpreted the notion of intentional action. Thus, I wiD show the
reasons why r want to distinguish between intentional and deliberate action.
It is quite easy to separate those events that come under the name 'intentional
actions' and those that do not. The sun shines - that is not an intentional action, or action
at all. Mary runs after a ladybird - that is an intentional action. John does not know that
there is a banana slcin on the floor and slips on this skin - that is not an intentional action.
As my analysis of'self-deception' has demonstrated, knowledge of bow the word is used
does not guarantee that it will be easy 10 formulatc the meaning ofthe word., in this case,
(0 state what intentional action is and what makes it different from other events in the
world.
Quite a few philosophers have tried to elucidate the notion ofintentional action,
and [ will not attempt here to give an account of everything that is said about actions,
intentions and intentional actions. I want to mention only one aspect of the discussion on
the nature of intentional actions, namely, the difference between intentional actions and
actions that are intended. As G. E. M. Anscombe in her book. Intention notes, there is a
6.
certain tcmplatioo to say that the words 'intention' and 'intentional' mean different things
in different CODtexts (I). When one talks about 'intentional actions' or 'intentions in
actions,' one thing is meant; when one talks about intentions as certain states ofmind., the
word 'intention' is used somehow differently; and when one talks about intentions that
concern future actions, the word 'intention' bas some specific meaning different from the
other uses.
for example, Mary bad planned to spend her holiday running after ladybirds and
so she did. It seems natural to say lhat Mary had an intention in the fonn ofa plan or idea
that she later realized. Nevenheless, not all actions that are called 'intentional actions' are
intended beforehand. First of all, there are intentional actions that are perfonned
spontaneously (Searle 84). For example, ifa plate slips from. my hands and I catch it, my
catching aCthe plate is an intentional action that is not intended beforehand. Or there are
intentional actions that arc performed out of habit. For example, Seth went 10 the
medicine cltest for some aspirin and, instead of aspirin, absent-mindedly took the tooth-
paste out cBbe chest (Davis Theory 59). In these cases, the action is intentional. because
Seth did not just grab the first thing that happened 10 be in the chest; be forget that he
inlended to take some aspirin and absentmindedly look something that he was used to
taking out of the medicine chest. There is no prior intention to take tooth-paste, and the
word 'intention' must be used in some other sense.
Anscombe claims !hat the word 'intention' is used in the same sense both in the
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case ofan action that is intended in advance aDd in the case ofan action that is not
intended in advance (90). lntended or not, intentional actions, according to Anscombe.
are actions that can be explained by reasons on which the person acts (9,90). And the
word 'intentional' refers to a certain fonn ofdescription ofactions. namely, the descrip-
tion that indicates lhe reasons for these actions (84-85).
Several philosophers have argued that the intentions that concern future actions
are not just descriptions of the reasons for such actions., and they distinguish between
intention, or intending, as a paniculat Slate ofan agent, or mind, or consciousness. that
sometimes precedes the action and intention as an intrinsic characteristic ofintentiooal
action (Davis neory 59-60. Davidson ~lnlending" 84-85, Searle 84-85). Davis claims
that there are stales of intending and there are intentional actions. and the two must be
"sharply distinguished" (59). Davidson talks about 'pure intending,' and, according to
Davidson, pure ullending is not always present when somebody acts intentionally
("Imending" 88). Searle distinguishes between 'intention in action' and 'prior intention,'
and there are inlentional actions that are nol preceded by prior intention (84).
[fthere are such states as pure intending or prior intention, I would like to know
more about thcircharacleristics. Davis describes a prior intention in the following way:
(I) "Ifx inlends to do an A [an action], then x believes and would claim to know that be
will intentionally do an A. or at least try" (Theory 76); (2) "[fx nonobservationally
believes and would claim to know that he will intentionally do an A. or at least try, then
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he intends to do an A (or atlcast to try)N (Theoty 71); (3) "Intending to do an A isjust
nonobservationally believing (and being ready to claim knowledge) that onc will do an A.
or at least uy" (17Ieory 77). The problem with the attempts to identifY intention with the
beliefs about one's funue action is that one cannot distinguish between wishful thinking
and intention, oc simple prediction ofone's actions and intention (Brabnan 377). For
example. knowing how much coffee I usually drink, I can predict thai: at Mary's party I
will drink: four cups ofcoffee. Nevertheless. my prediction does not imply that I intend
to drink four cups ofcoffee. I can intend to drink twelve cups at Mary's party, but after
the fourth. I have a definite feeling that I do not want more coffee. In this case my
prediction that I will drink four cups would be true, but my intention to drink twelve cups
would not be carried out.
According to Searlc, intending is onc ofthe Intentional states (3).10 Intentional
stales are mental states that are "directed at or about or ofobjects and states ofaffairs in
the world" (I). To illustrate what Searle means, I can say that believing and being angry
are mental states about something, for example, about bad weather, while pain and bad
mood are mental states that are not about or directed at anything. [am angry abouJ bad
weather, but my bad mood is not about bad weather, it is rather caused by bad weather.
lntentional states are different, and Searle uses several criteria for distinguishing them.
10 In order to distinguish between the word 'intentional' that is used to describe a
particular kind of action and the word 'intentional' that is used to cbaracterize a property
of many menta! states, Searle capitalizes the latter.
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Two aCthe most important ones for understanding any kind ofintention are the psycho-
logical modes and the Intentional content Intentional content descnbes what the
lntentional stalC is about. or at what it is directed. So ifl believe lhat it is raining, the
content ermy mental state is that it is raining. Searle does not say very much about the
psychological mode ofIntcntional stales,. but basically it is the way the Intentional
content is presented in me Intentional stale. Thus, my believing that it is raining differs
from my being angry that it rains, or my being glad that it is raining.
According to Searle, there are two Intentional states lhat are caUcd intentions.
One is intention in action; the other one is prior intention (84). Searle is quite clear about
the differences in the content of these Intentional states. The intention in action is
directed at some event, for example. a movement crmy arm. while the prior intention is
directed at action, for example, the action of moving my arm (92-93). He also is quite
clear about the psychological mode of intention in action. According to Searle, there is a
certain experience ofacting (87). If I have the experience and the arm. goes up then my
intention in action is canied out, or satisfied, and I have performed an action. Ifl have
lhe experience oflifting my arm. and lhe arm does not go up, my intention is not satisfied
and there is no action. To illustrate his claim, Searle describes an experiment with a
patient whose arm is anaesthetized and who is asked to raise this arm. "lbe patient's eyes
are closed and unknown to him his arm is held to prevent it from moving. When he
opens his eyes he is surprised to find that be has not raised IUs annR (89). Similarly, if
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my arm goes up and (do DOt have the experieoce ofacting, there is no intention and there
is no action. Searle mentions an example ora patient whose ann moves because oflhe
electrode applied to a particular pan orms brain. The patient denies that be has moved
the ann (89).
Unfonunately, it is not so easy to characterize prior intention. Searle shows the
distinction between the Intentional content ofbotb kinds of intentions, but he does 001
characterize the mode aCme prior intention. A prior intention is directed at the action,
and Searle explains that in order for a prior intention 10 De carried out. or satisfied, the
person must act, for example, there must be a certain experience of lifting my ann and the
event afmy arm going up. What is not so clear is the characteroftbe psychological
mode which the prior intention has. Searle claims that both intention in action and prior
intention are causally self-referential, that is to saY,lhe canying out ofthe intention
requires not just ilia! some movement or action follows the intention. but that the
movement or action is caused by the inlention. So maybe the difference in the mode is
the difference between the experience ofcausing some event (causing the movement of
my arm) and the experience of causing an action (causing the movement of the ann
together with the experience of moving it). Nevertheless, as Davidson has noted, there
can be intentions that are not followed by action rlntending" 84). Describing intentions
in action, Searle himselfpresents a case cbaracterized by intention in action but lacking
an action: I experience my ann going up, but my arm does not go up (89). Here, the
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psychological mode of intention is the cJq)erience ofm-oYing one's ann. Searle has not
described a similar example ofprior intention. and it is not clear what it would be like.
An experience ofan action that is not followed by the action is hatdly a good character-
ization ofprior intention. because the prior intention is not an experience ofaction. My
prior intention to collect butterflies is not an experience ofcollecting butterflies; it is
something else, and I want to know what it is.
Searle also suggests that there are certain similarities between the two kinds of
intentions and perception and memory. A memory ofseeing a flowerreprcsents the
experience of seeing and the flower, and a prior intention represents the experience of
acting and certain movement (95). The emphasis tics on the phrase 'to represent.'
According to Searle, the phrase 'to represent' is used to describe the conditions under
which the particular Intentional state is 'satisfied'(I2). For example, a belicfthatp is
satisfied whenp is true. Similarly. a statcofmemory is satisfied when there bas been the
visual experience ofa flower that is caused by the presence of the flower (9S). Prior
intention seems to be satisfied when this intention is followed by an action, that is,
experience ofacting and the movement of the ann, for instance.
1 must say that this analogy is nol very helpful for understanding the psychologi-
cal mode of intention. To know wbal memory is, il is not enough to know lhat mernol)'
.concerns past experiences. My anger or joy can concern my past experiences, too, and
the characteristic that separates these different Intentional attitudes is their psychological
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mode. Similarly, to know what prior intention is, it is not eoougb to know that prior
intentions concern actiOM. [want to know what makes the intention to lift my ann a
different IniCObonai state from, for example, imagining that I lift my arm. In conclusion.
r can say that Searle docs not provide a satisfactory characterizatiooofprior intending
and he does not show the way one could attempt to characterize the psychological mode
arthis intention.
I think that afthe thIec philosophers I have looked at, Donald Davidson character·
izes intending best ofalL In his article "Intending," Davidson claims that intending, or
pure intending, is an aU-<lut judgement. [must add immediately that this claim that
intending is a judgement should not be taken at face value. Davidson claims that he
analyses judgements in order to "mark differences among the attitudes" (97). Davidson
gives this comment only in a footnote; it seems to me that this comment is important.
The main distinction between judgement and attitude: seems to be the propositional form
that judgements necessarily have, but attitudes need not have. According to Davidson,
there are judgements that correspond to cet1ain attitudes. For example, a judgemcot
about the desirability of something corresponds to the attitude of wanting (96). It seems
that the all-out judgemcot corresponds to the attitude of intending. Nevertheless,
Davidson in one paragraph claims that intention is a judgement (99), but in another he
states that "intending and wanting belong to the same genus ofpro attitudes expressed
[my italics} by valuejudgements~(102). So it is not clear bow seriously one must take
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his claim about intending being ajudgemenl.
Davidson's interpretation ofpure intending is easier to understand when one
knows Davidson's objections 10 the view that pure intending is nothing but wanting to do
the action in question. As Davidson correctly argues, the judgement that SODlething is
desirable does not mean that [ intend to do the particular action. For example, if!
conclude that despite lhe danger of being binen by a tsetse fly it is desirable 10 visit
Africa, that does not mean I intend to go 10 Africa. Davidson writes.
It is a reason for acting that the action is believed to have some desirable
characteristic, but the fact that the action is performed represents a further
judgement that the desirable characteristic was enough 10 act on (98).
According to Davidson, the further judgement is 'all-out judgement' or pure
intention (99). The term 'aU-out judgement' sounds a bit unusual, and I think that a better
expression to characterize this judgement and ultimately the state of the agent is 'commit·
ment to action' which is used by Bratman (Bratman 376). As Davidson says, there can be
different beliefs and desires that precede the intention and influence what kind of
intention it will be, but at one moment there must be some commitment to one particular
action. As an all-out judgement differs from other judgements, so commitment differs
from other anitudes or states ofthe agent. It is also c1eartbat one can have a commitment
to some action without really experiencing or carrying out this action.
There is just one more conunent that I want to make about pure intending.
Davidson emphasizes that one can have pure intending to do some action "without having
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decided 10 do it, deLiberated about it. formed an intention to do it. or reasooed about it"
("Intending" 84). I must agree that commibnent to some action need not require previous
deliberation on whether or not to commit oneself to this action or DOL Intentions can
sometimes be quite spontaneous. I can agree that intending may not be preceded by
decision as long as the latter implies making a choice among options. I can also agree
that inientioDS are not always expressed in clearly articulated form like, for example, "I
intend 10 shut the window." Nevertheless, Davidson's claim may sound mysterious
because Davidson's emphasis on the cOlUlection between intending and the judgement
suggests an explicitly stated intention, so in some sense a 'formed' intention.
It seems that the problem lies in a specific use ofconcepts. Fint, as I already
noled, Davidson chooses 10 analyse judgements only because he thinks that the analysis
of them will help him 10 mark differences among different attitudes. If, after all, pure
intending is an attitude, it docs need to have the fonn ofan explicitly stated judgement.
Secondly, Davidson's claim that pure incending does not require a 'formed intention' is
not meant co suggest that pure intention is something vague and amorphous or that it is
somehow reducible to somelhing else, for- example, beliefs. According 10 Davidson, the
intention is not formed as far as hfonning an intention requires conscious deliberation or
decision" ("Inlendingh89). It seems that the only thing Davidson wants to say is that 10
have a pun: intention. one does not need 10 engage in a process ofconscious weighing of
reasons pro and contra an action.
7'
I can swnmarite the results aCthe analysis ofdifferent accounts on intcoded
actions. Not all, but some actions are preceded by an anitude that is called intending.
The intending that precedes an action is a commitment to that action. Intending is a
specific attitude different from thedesin: to act in a certain way or the belicftbat onc will
act in a certain way. [ntendingcan be the result ofdelibcration or the comparison of
different options. but neither deliberation nor weighing ofoptions is necessary for
intending.
Finally, I am ready to define what is deliberate action. Deliberate action is an
action that is preceded by intention, or a commitment to this action. So deliberate self-
deception is an actioo lhat is preceded by intention to deceive oneself. Not aU intentional
actions are intended beforehand. For example. spontaneous actions are DOt intended, but
still count as intentional actions. So. an account that explained self-deception as a
spontaneous avoidance ofevidence should be considered as an account of intentional but
not deliberate self-deception.
3.2 Deliberate Self-Deception
In Chapter 2 army thesis, [tried to show that in ordinary language the word 'self·
deception' is used in two different ways. 'Self-deception' is understood both as making
oneselfbelieve what one knows is false and as biased believing. The fonner formulation
7.
is paradoxical. the Ianer is not. The sccondofthe two is understood as a state ofmind in
which one 6nds ooeselfrathertban ODe which bas brought about. My initial interest in
self-deception concerned the possibility of controlling one's mind and making myself
believe what [ am disinclined to believe. and the interpretation ofself-deception as
making oneselfbelicve what one knows is false seems to fit better with my initial interest
than self-deception interpreted as a state that is not brought about by the action of the
agent. So I will concentrate on the interpretation that suggests certain actions on the pan
of the agent, that is. self-deception as making ooeselfbelieve what one knows is false.
The notion of making oneselfbclieve what one knows is false has puzzled
philosophers because of its paradoxical nature. Dealing with the paradoxical aspects of
the meaning of the term, philosophers have adopted two strategies. One strategy is to
identify situations in which the paradoxicallerm 'self-deception' is used and to explain
the behaviour ofso-called self-dcceivers in a way that does not contain paradoxical
accounts ofthe self-deceiver's states of mind or intentions. Philosophers who choose tllis
strategy usually try to providc thcir own, non-paradoxical, definition of self-deception.
Thc second stratcgy in dcaling with paradoxical 'self-deception' is to providc some modcl
of what could happen in the human mind that would to a cenain degree correspond 10 the
paradoxical formulation of self-deception.
No doub!, the explanation ofthe behaviour ofthe so-<:alled self-deceiver can
demonstratc !he reasons why one is tempted to use a paradoxical account ofself-decep-
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tion. and modelling can. and is meant to, provide an adequate explanation of real
examples., so lhe two methods are companlJle and do not exclude each other. Nevertbe-
less, at least sometimes examples ofself-dcception can be explained in a simpler and
more plausible way than by models ofparadoxical thinking processes or paradoxical
stales of mind. For example., Mary ignores an obvious fact that her husband is unfaithful.
If there are good reasons fur claiming that Mary simpLy is too busy to ootice the evidence
oCher husband's unfaithfulness and she does not really make herselfbelieve what she
knows is false, tlten there is no need to evoke any models ofparadoxical thinking. So
models of possible self-deception should not be perceived as the right way ofexplaining
the behaviour that is usually associated with the name 'self-deception.' Even if[ prove
that Mary could have made herselfbelieve what she knew is false. [ cannot claim that
Mary has indeed made berselfbelieve what she knew is false. unless I have shown that
other explanations of Mary's ignoring of the obvious facts are wrong.
My interest in self-deception arises from my interest in the possibility ofcontrol-
ling what one believes and what one does not believe. Ifself-deception sometimes is the
deliberate making ofoneselfbclieve what one knows is false, I would have found one of
the ways in which one can control what one believes. While philosophers sometimes
charge self-deceivers with intentional self-deception, it is hard to leU to what extent self-
deception could be intentional. II No doubt, the fully conscious decision to make oneself
11 Some philosophers who have suggested intentional self-deception: Mele
(/"ationa/ity 133), JOM King-Farlow (132-133), Jennifer Radden (L IS). Mary
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believe what one knows is false is an extreme and the most implausible version of
intentional self-deception. Implausible does not mean impossible. and I could claim that
some self-dcceivers are consciously controlling their beliefs. The interesting thing about
this claim is that it would be very bard to prove or disprove such a claim by observing the
behaviour ofsome self-deceiver. lfMary believes in something that is obviously false,
how could I tell by observing her behaviour whether she is deliberately deceiving herself,
deceiving hcrselfiotentionally but not deliberately, or her mind has played some nasty
trick on ber? I doubt lhat it is possible to teU which aCtbe three is the case. Ofcourse, I
could adopt the explanation that seems to me more plausible. but this approach would
still leave a possibility that another explanation is the correct onc. For example, I can say
thaI Mary simply pretends to ignore the fact that her husband is unfaithful to ber, but
unless I know that deliberate self-deception is impossible, there is a chance that, knowing
thai her husband is unfaithful to ber, Mary makes berselfbelieve that he is faithful and
makes it deliberately.
To find out wbether deliberate self-deception is possible. I want to choose the
second of the methods I mentioned in the beginning ofthis section, namely, I will try to
find out whether there is a model for deliberate self-deception. I will try to analyze the
possibility that self-deceivers intend to make themselves believe what they know is false
and ultimately succeed in their attempt. I do not claim that my analyses will explain all
Baghramian rStrategics" 93).
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cases ofwbat is called 'self-deception; but 1 think that lbis analysis will shed some light
on what can and what cannot be claimed concerning self-deccivers. I think: that this
analysis particularly concerns the claims that seLf-dcceivCfS choose to be deceived. or
choose to believe what they know to be false. or choose to believe what they want to
believe. [want to know whether it is possible to deceive oneselfdehberately.
3.3 Self.Deception as Basic Action
Some of my intentions arc easier to realize than others. If I intend to louch my
ear, I can realize my intention wilbout delay; if! intend to catch a dragon-fly, there are
many things I must do before [catch one, for example. I bave to leave my office because
there are no dragon·flies in it; if I inlend to mink ora sentence with the subject 'dragon-
fly,' I can produce one ~ust like that'; 'A dragon-fly flies;' if I intend to write a poem such
that the end ofeach line rhymes with the word 'ear,' I would have to think for a while
before I CQuld come up with one.
I think that the difference between such 'simple' and 'complicated' actions is well
fannulated by John Searle. He distinguishes between basic actions and actions that are
not basic. Searle defines basic actions. or more precisely - a basic action type. the
following way: "A. is a basic action type for an agent S iffS is able to perform acts of type
A and S can intend to do an act of type A without intending to do any other action by
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means ofwhich he intends 1000 A" (tOO). If I understand Searle's formulation correctly,
die word 'intend' is meant to designate a prior intention, and the basic action is a deh"ber-
ate action. So, for example, turning on the light is a basic action., because I do not intend
to turn on the light and to reach for the switch and to tum the switch: I intend to tum on
the light and just reach for the switch and tum it. Ofcourse, there can be circumstances
when I cannot realize my intention ofrurning on the light without intending to do
something more than just turning on lbe lighL For example. it could be dark in the room
and I might not know exactly where the switch is located. Therefore, to carry out my
intention to tum on the light, I first ofall intend to find the switch. In this case, turning
on the light is not a basic action. As Searle says, his definition ofbasic action type makes
actions basic relative to the agent and his or ber skills (tOO).
The name 'basic action' is not invented by Searle, but his understanding ofbasic
actions is different from. for example, that ofArthur Danta, who introduced the term into
the philosophical discourse, or Alvin I. Goldman. who discusses basic act-typeS and act-
tokens. Danto defined basic action as an action that is not caused by any other action
(Danto 142). Goldman's definition of basic action-type requires for the action to be the
result of a want. and it requires that basic action-types do DOt depend on the knowledge of
how the act must be perfonned. and knowledge about causal laws that would produce the
desired action (Goldman 66-67). The most important difference between these two and
Searle's definition is that neither Goldman's nor Danto's definition of basic actions
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includes the condition ofintcnding.
I think Searle's distinction between basic actions and actions that are not basic
reveals a real distinction between two different types of intended actioDS. 1be distinction
is important for me because I am interested in actions that are intended and carried out
according 10 this intention, that is, I am interested in del.J.berate actions. Moreover. his
definition is helpful for formulating one type ofaction that is noticed by philosopbers
writing about the possibility for one to believe at will. For example., Bernard Williams
writes that some things happen to respond 10 the will and some not (148). To make
oneseffblush, one can use roundabout routes like placing oneself in a situation which
would make one blush, but onccannol blush at will (148). Similarly, one could make
oneself believe in something by going to a hypnotist and acquire a beliefby suggestion,
but one cannot believe at will (149). Jon Elster claims that some people try to achieve
~by one stroke and at will what can at most be realized at one or more removes" (Sour
56). Though one can try to fall asleep by trying to distractooeselffrom any thoughts, one
cannot make oneseLf fall asleep at will or make ooeselfbelieve what one wants to believe
(Sour 45,52). I think that Searle's definition of basic action can provide a good fonnula-
tion for wbal Williams and Elster wanl to say. Both Williams and Eisler claim that
believing as a basic action is impossible, that is to say, I cannot intend to make myself
beLieve that p and cany out my intention ~ust like that' without intending to do anything
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[fa basic action ofmaking oncselfbelievethatp is impossible., then the same is
cenainly true about the basic action ofmalcing oneselfbelieve what one knows is false_
In order to achieve the latter, one must be able to realize the fonner. For a while, I will
[eave aside the aspect ofone's knowing that p is false and wiU address only the question
ofthe possibility of making oneself believe that p. The claim that making oneselfbelieve
that p cannot be a basic action seems to be conect, but I would like to explain why it is
correct. To avoid repeating the formula 'a basic action of making onesclfbelieve thatp,' I
will use Williams' and Elster's expression and call this kind ofbasic action believing at
will, or believing lhatp at will. One oftbe comments one could make about the claim
thai believing at will is impossible is lIIat nobody really claims that such an action is
possible. In other words. there is nothing interesting in the claims about the impossibility
ofsuch an action. I must agree that I have not heard anybody saying that he or she can
believe at will whatever and whenever he or she wants. At the same time, there are
indications that believing at will is considered a possible action. For example, H. H.
Price turns his attention to some expressions in ordinary language that seem to imply
there is believing at will. For example, he employs the phrases "I prefer to believe that,"
or "I can't and won't believe this," or "I refuse 10 believe that" (3,7,11). It seems that the
words 'prefer: 'can' and 'will' imply there is a choice on the part ofthe person. The penon
can choose to believe one or another statement.
Remember also Elster's claim that "it can bardly be denied that people often try to
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acmeve by one stroke and at will what can at most be realized at one or more removes"
(Sour 56). He does not explain which things one can realize 'at several removes' but
cannot realize al will. Nevenheless, among his usual examples of attempts to bring
certain states ofmind 'al several moves' is tbeattempt to make onesclfbelievc tbatp
(Sour 57). So most likely Elster would allow that somebody could attempt believing at
will. When Elster cbaracterizes different kinds ofself-deception. he says, "At onc
extreme is the attempt to carry oUl. say, the decision to believe in adirec:t and fully
conscious manner" (Ulysses 176). Elster does not say that auempting to believe at will
implies that the person considers believing at will possible, but I would certainly say that
if there are such attempts. men those making them must also be the persons who claim
that believing at will is possible. It is !lOt an evident nulb that there is a connection
between attempting to believe at will and believing that believing at wiIl is possible.
Therefore, I will mention some coDSiderations on this matter.
As Davidson has indicated. it is impossible for me to decide 10 do something, if I
believe that the action I want to bring about is impossible (Davidson "Intending" 93). [
think that this claim is tnIe also ror intending. For example, I cannot intend to flap my
ears, because I know that it is impossible. [canoot even say that I intended but railed to
carry out my intention, because intending involves certain commiunent to the action that
[ decide to perform, and this commitment is absent when I know that the action is
impossible. I can consider in my mind a thought 'I will flap my ears,' but this entertain·
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ment ofa thought is oot intending yet. So it seems that I cannot really intend to do
something that [ think is impoSSIble.
Besides actions that are believed to be definitely possible and actions that are
believed 10 be impoSSIble, there are actions about which one does not know whether they
are possible to realize or not. For example, I may not know whether it is possible to
believe at will. So ODe could say that in these cases one can try to realize the action. It is
certainly aue that [do not know whether it is poSSIble to swim three minutes under water
without breathing and still I could try to do that. Nevertheless. the question is whether. in
this case, my trying implies any attitude towards the possibility ofthe action. [think that
it does. At least, wmcbeverbasic or non·basic action I think about, [discover that if I
intend to do something, [ do not need 10 know whether lite action is possible. but I
certainly have to believe that it might be possible. I cannot intend to cbirr like a grass-
hopper unless I believe that it is somehow possible [0 do that. l cannot intend to swim
like a water-measurer unless [believe [ might be able to do that.
It seems to me that ifI can try to believe at will, [must believe that such an action
might be possible. Nevertheless, when I think about the possibility ofbelicving at will,
the first problem that strikes me is that it is not clear what it is like to believe at will.
Believing in itself is not an action. While the realization of my intcution to make myself
believe that p certainly would be an action, it is not clear what kind of action it is. In
cases when I do not know whether the action is possible and believe that it might be, I
••
usually know wbat I should do in order to realize it or tty to realize it. lD the case of
believing at wiU. I am simply left with nothing that I could try to do. The same is true of
Elster's eumple ofmalcing oneself fall asleep (4S). [f falling asleep must be understood
as something that people try to achieve at one stroke and at will, then it is not clear what
the action could be, what they could try to do. I can imagine different methods for
making myselffall asleep, sucb as counting lambs and trying to think about something
relaxing, but all these methods indicate that falling asleep is not a basic action and cannot
be carried out just like that. Both in cases ofbelieving and falling asleep, me basic action
is impossible to realize just because there is no basic action that could be called 'bcliev·
ing' or 'falling asleep.'
There is one more place in which one can look for possibility to believe at will. It
seems true that I am not aware ofall the actions [can do. For example. I do not know
whether [can jump over a fence two meters high. Most likely I cannot, but there could
be a situation, fleeing from a bear for example, when I suddenly jump over this fence.
Something similar is suggested by William James in his article "The Will co Believe."
He denies that one can believe wbalever one wanlS. For example. one cannot imagine
that two one-dollar bills in a pockel make a hundred dollars (5). At tbe same time, James
seems [0 suggest tbat in particular situations.. one could make a choice between believing
one thing or another (3, II). [f such cboosing 10 believe is possible. it could be a good
example ofa basic action that concerns believing. He characterizes this situation as a
8.
situation ofgenuine option which consists ofthrec clemCUlS (3). First, the person who
chooses between two hypotheses must consider both hypotheses as being 'alive,' that is,
they must have some appeal to the person. Second. lite hypotheses must be forced. that is
to say, the person cannot avoid choosing between the two options. Third, the choice
between two hypotheses must be 6 momentous" (3). The third clause means that lhe
situation ofcboice is unique and bas important implications for the person that makes the
choice.
Unfortunately. the situation ofa genuine option docs not generate believing at
will. First nfall. it is bard to see how anybody ever could be forced to make a choice
between believing two opposite beliefs. Ofcourse, asked whether I believe that trees
have leaves or that they do not I answer that I believe that they do. I doubt that I make
any choice between believing that trees have leaves and that they do not, and I certainly
do not believe at will that trees have leaves. Ijust believe that trees have leaves. One
could object that the option between believing thai trees have or have not leaves is not an
option that is 'alive' and that in case ofoptions thai are 'alive' one has to make a choice. (
must say that even in cases when bo!h options have intellectual appeal, ( am not forced to
make !he choice between believing one of!he opposites. In a situation when bo!h options
seem to me equally believable, [simply do not have beliefs about !he tru!h OT falsity of
the opposites. 1am not making a choice, aT believing at will. If it seems plausible bo!h
that my son is cruel to animals and that he is not, I can look for evidence !hat would
'0
support onc oftbe possibilities, but I am not fon;ed to make a choice between believing
that he is crucl to animals and that he is not.
One could still insist that the options I just presented are not genuine options., and
when one is confronted with genuine options., one makes an act ofchoice that could be
called believing at will. My only concern about this claim is that I cannot imagine any
such options. At least, James has not provided an example ofa situation when one is
forced to choose between believing in one ortwa opposite propositions. or an example of
somebody who makes this choice.
For example, be claims that the ~question of having moral beliefs at all or not
having them is decided by our will" or that questions ofpersonaJ relationships cannot
wait for the answer because waiting can cause failure in relationsbips (22.23). Finally, he
claims that questions of faith must be decided by one's "active good-will" (28). I think
that in all the three cases lhe choice compels one to act in one or another way, but never
to believe one of the proposed beliefs. I can agree with James that moral questions are
questions "whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (22). Nevertheless, [doubt that
moral questions require choice between beliefs. A doctor can be fon:ed to choose
between performing or not performing an abortion or not doing, but he or she cannot be
fon:ed 10 choose between believing that abortion is morally permissible or believing that
it is not. While !he doctor has no options except 10 perform or not perform the operation,
there is always a choice to perform or nol perform !he operation without believing !hat
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abortion is morally right or wrong. The doctor can suddenly feel a conviction that
abortion is wrong, and it is possible that after reflecting upon the arguments supporting or
opposing abortion. be or she comes to the CQllClusion that abortion is morally right - in
neither case would [be willing to say that the doctor made his or her choice at will. and I
cannot explain what it wouJd be like to make such a choice at will. l would say the same
about one's choice of faith. One can be forced to choose between living according to the
Commandments and not living according to them, between going to church and not
going, but one cannOI be forced 10 believe in any religious doctrine or choose to believe
in one at will.l~
James also describes a situation when a person is forced to answer the question
'Do you like me or not?' I can agree with James that in certain situations the hesitation in
answering this question and the search for the correct answer can have unpleasant
consequences. Still, [ would not consider this example as an example of forced cboice
between believing that one likes some person or that one does not. The only choice thai
is forced here is the choice between actions: either to say 'Yes,' or to say 'No,' or to be
thoughtfully silent. Ofcourse, it is possible that one answers sincerely after thinking
121t is possible 10 imagine a situation that living according to the Commandments
and going 10 church, I end up believing in some religious doctrine. Nevertheless, this
situation cannot be used as an example ofbelieving at will as basic action., because it
requires mort intended actions than just making oneself believe in the bUth of some
doctrine. Since 1am interested in James' idea of the will to believe because it seems 10
suggest a possibility of intended believing as basic action, 1do not analyse the
possibilities that do not imply this Icind ofbasic actions.
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about the question or right on the spot, but it is bard 10 see bow the answer could be a
result of willing to believe. or intending to believe. ordecidiDg to believe.
It is very poSSIble that James is claiming just that sometimes one has to make
decisions on the basis offcelings and not on the basis ofjustified belie[ One cannot
think very long after the question about one's liking or not liking and one has to answer
inunediatcly relying on one's feelings. ITJames does oot: want to say anything mon:: than
that, then his use aCthe word 'will' is somewhat puzzling, and he cenainlydoes not
explain how believing at will is possible. I think I must conclude that none aCtbe philos·
ophers have told me how deliberately making oneself to believe some p could be
possible. Consequently, it seems to me that deliberate self-deception as a basic action is
impossible. lfthere is deliberate self-deception. it cannot be realized with just one
in!cntion,or'just like that.'
3.4 Self-Deception as Non-Basic Action
Since deliberate self-deception as basic action seems to be impossible. the only
place to look for deliberate self-deception is among actions that arc not basic. namely. the
actions that require for their realization some additional intended actions.
3.4.1 The Condition of Knowing
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It is certainly bard to tcU which actions are those that one needs to carry out in
order to realize onc's intention to makeoocselfbelievc wbatooe knows is False, tbat is to
say, to realize deliberate self-deception. To specify the boundaries in which the needed
actions could be found. I want to look at the implications oftbe condition that one should
know that the beliefone makes oncselfbelieve is false.
[ must say that the implications are quite discouraging. The problem lies in the
nantle of beliefs. It seems that when I claim that I believe thatp. I am claiming thatp is
in fact true. Using Williams's expression, I can say that "beliefs aim at truth" (136).
Consequently, ifonc at the same time claims both that one knows that p is false and that
one believes that p, one assens a contradiction. Such a claim would mean that onc at the
same time consciously and explicitly believes something that one consciously and
explicitly believes to be false. Since beliefs aim at truth. such a stale of believing is
paradoxical.
I think that I can also claim that such a state ofbelieving is impossible. At least,
any attempt to imagine a state ofconsciollSly and explicil.ly believing in something that
one consciously and explicitly believes to be false fails. I would discount any reports
about believing something one Imows is false as misuse of language, or as a report that
employs some specific understanding of the words 'believing' and 'knowing.' Davidson
writes that "nothing a person could say or do would count as good enough grounds for the
attribution ofa straightforwardly and obviously contradictory belief" ("Deception" 81). I
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think that the same is true about the attribution ofconsciously and explicitly believing
something one consciously and explicitly knows to be false. Ifone announced that one is
believing something onc knows is false, I would first of all try to understand what one
means by the words 'knowing' and 'believing: For example, ifone said that one knows
that one's frieod is guilty of a crime. but one still believes that the friend is innocent. I
would interpret this claim as suggesting doubts about lhe guilt or innocence nfllie friend,
or failure 10 come to tenns with the deeds ofone's friend. Certainly, I would hesitate to
ascribe to the person a paradoxical state ofbelieving something the person knows is false.
Ifself-deception were a state wben a person consciously and explicitly believes
something one consciously and explicitly knows to be false. self-deception would be an
impossible state to achieve. Similarly, a thought about intending to bring about such a
state could be entertained, but nobody could really illlend to achieve this statc. Neverthe-
less, the question I intended to answer was not the question ofwhetber onc can bring
about a state of believing consciously and explicitly what one knows is false. but the
question of whether it is possible to make oneself believe what one knows is false and to
do it deliberately. lntending to make oneself believe what one knows is false is not
identical with intending to believe consciously and explicitly what one consciously and
explicitly knows is false. For example. ODe can easily imagine reasons for the fonner,
wtule it is hard to imagine why anyone should attempt the latter. I can try to make myself
believe what I know is false, because I find the truth distUrbing and I prefer illusions 10
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the bulb.. Nevertheless. the only reason to think about inteoding 10 bring about the state
ofconsciously aDd explicitly believing and knowing opposite things would be a whim Of
curiosity about ooc's IDClltai capacities.
l think that, knowing lbe reasons why one would delibcr3le deceive oneself. one
can undemand why self-deception does not require that knowing and believing opposite
things is simultaneous or that both believing and knowing are conscious and explicit.
When intending to make oneselfbclieve what one knows is false, one intends either 10
acquire the preferred belief or to get rid ofone's knowledge. and in either casc ooe is not
interested in preserving one's conscious and explicit knowledge. The self-decciver knows
some proposition p to be false, and be or she makes himselfor berselfbclieve that p is
Still, the condition ofknowing that tlat-p bas its implications with regard to
deliberate self.deception. Since ODC cannot consciously and explicitly believe something
malone consciously and explicitly knows to be false., knowledge aCthe falsity of the
proposition p must be somehow undcnnincd. As long as I consciously and explicitly
Ienow that p is false. all my anempts to make myselfbclicve thatp will fail. The question
'How is it possible to undermine one's own knowledge?' seems to be a bard one, unless
onc answers that it is impossible to undcnnine one's knowledge. Certainly, it is very hard
to imagine thai: one could cease to know, for example, one's own age or the number of
legs a butterfly has.
,.
3.4.2 To Forget What One Knows
While it is true that one usually would know one's age, it is also true that one does
nol know, or is not aware of, some things onc knew some time ago. Forexample, [do
not know the basic laws ofthennodynamics that I knew len years ago. Naturally, one
way one could seek to undermine one's knowledge is to try 10 forget something one
knows. I would like to know whether I could intend 10 forget something I know and real-
ize this intention.
The most straightforward approach is suggested by Thomas Schelling. According
to him. there are many things one can do with one's mind, and he enumerates a list of
different things that people use in order to forget what they want 10 forget (185-190). For
example. one can sleep so that one would not think about unpleasant things, one can use
alcohol or walch movies. Schelling himself suggests that self-dcceivcrs could pick: up
something from lbis menu (184). [am afraid this menu does not suit my interests at this
moment. The methods Schelling suggests remind me ofthe example of the drug dealer
who, in some sense, deceived himself by undergoing a seance ofhypnosis (see Section
2.2.1). It is possible that one can get rid ofone's knowledge using alcobol. hypnosis or
sorcery. but one would not call such a manipulation ofone's beliefs self-deception or
deliberate self-deception. Self-deception seems to require that olle succeeds in deceiving
oneself using only one's mental capacities.
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The easiest thing one could propose is to avoid thinking about something one
knows and to hope lhat the knowledge will disappear by itself. Any attempts to forget in
this way. for example, the name of the capital ofCanada would be a tlopeless enterprise.
But, certainly, one could hope that such a method will help one forget certain facts about
some period in one's life and make it look better in one's own eyes. It is bard to say wbat
precisely is the difference between one's knowing the capital ofCanada and one's know·
ing some episode from childhood. but there must be some difference, ifil is easier to
forget one than another. Probably, the fact about lhe capital ofCanada is more useful in
everyday life than childhood memories, and there aIe many more occasions when one is
reminded aCthe name ofthe capital than there are occasions when one is reminded of
childhood memories. In any case, I would like to know how I could forget these memo-
ries.
Psychologists Daniel M. Wegner and David 1. Scbneider also have asked the
question whether it is possible 10 forget what one knows. Their background interest
seems in some way related to mine. They want to explore the possibilities of "psycholog.
ical self-help" that can be understood as lhe management of unwanted thoughts and "the
unwanted realities that those thoughts represent" (300). They suggest that the method by
which such suppression can be done is by concentrating one's attention on something
other than the thought that one wants to suppress.
The idea that the directing ofone's attention could help one to deceive oneself is
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mentioned by several philosophers. Mele suggests that self-deccivets can intentionally
shift their attention from unpleasant thoughts (Irrationality 126). Baghramian lists
several 'strategies' self-deceivers can use, aDd one ofthe stra!cgies suggests a shift of
attention. Baghramian characterizes the strategy as avoiding "the undesirable thoughts or
conclusions by keeping one's mind occupied with unrelated matters" (91). Davidson
thinks that self-deceivers can intentionally direct their anention from the evidence that
favours some undesirable beliefp and so cause themselves believe the negation ofthep
("Deception" 88).
It is certainly true that sometimes one intentionally shifts one's attention from one
thought to another, and the thought one entertained first can disappear for good. For
example, [ remember something unpleasant Mary told me the other day. and I immedi·
ately, without having a second thought about berwords. nun my attention towards the
problem of self-deception. Every time I remember what she said, or part ofil., I think
about something else. It is quite possible that after some time [will DOt be able to
remember what exactly she said, while most likely I wiU remember that she said some-
thlng unpleasant.
In the case I just described the shift in attention was not intended beforehand.
Whenever the thought about Mary's words came up in my mind, I shifted my attention to
something else and did it quite spontaneously. I shifted my attention intentionally
because there was a reason for my doing so - [did not like what she said, but I did not
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plan or decide to shift my attention and., therefore. the shifting army attention was not
intended. However, what I want to know is whether I can get rid arrny memory oCher
words, ifl intended to get rid orit.
Wegner and Schneider have tried to perfonn an experimeDt where people are
asked not to think about a white bear. Such a request is certainly a request to shift one's
attention deliberately away from some thought, or in other words, to deliberately forget
something about which one is thinking. According to them, this experiment demonstrates
that one can control one's memories using what they caU 'primary suppression' and
'auxiliary concentration.' Auxiliary coocenttation is "attending 10 something because we
wish to suppress attention to something else;" primary suppression is "keeping attention
away from something because we want to do so" (290). [will not present all the details
of the experiment Basically, the subjects of the experiment are asked to think out loud
while trying not to think. about a white bear. Each time they think about one., they have 10
ring a bell (296). The results aCthe experiment are clear - the subjects are not able to
suppress effectively their thoughts about the white bear. while they succeed better when
they focus their attention on one particular thing and not just try to think about anything
that is not a white bear (297·299). The fina) recommendation Wegner and Scbneidercan
give to somebody who wants to get rid ofsome thought is "to avoid suppression, to stop
stopping [one's thoughts]" (300). Such a recommendation must be understood as
admitting the impossibility ofsuppressing some thought deliberately and, consequently,
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admitting the impossibility of making oneselfforgct something one knows.
Wegner and Schneider themselves have indicated that one must be cautious about
generalizing the experiment's results (301). According to them, the thought about a white
bear is different from the thoughts one tries tos~ in everyday life; the latter are
usually charged with different emotional anitudes. Moreover, the requirement that the
subjects must report their thoughts aloud adds some artificiality to the situation. I must
agree that the thoughts one usually tries to suppress have an emotional aspect, but [
would also add that thoughts that are charged with emotions are usually harder to
suppress than those that are not. When there is some thought that really bothers me, I
cannol get rid of it, while iff tllink about grasshoppers, I can quite easily find something
more interesting to think about and forget about grasshoppers. As Kierkegaard writes in
Either/Or, the ability to forget depends on how one remembers things and. ultimately,
how one experiences things (293).
In order to forget easily, one bas to experience everything without being amazed,
without enjoying anything too much or yielding to pain, i.e., without emotion. Never-
theless, emotional neutrality is not enough for suppressing a lhougbt; after all, the
subjects ofthe experiment could not suppress a thought that was emotionally neutral. I
think that the problem lies not in the fact that the subjects ofthe experiment were asked to
think aloud. I would rather think that the whole situation ofexperiment makes forgetting
the white bear impossible. be<:ause one cannot forget why one is in the situation where
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one has to suppress the thoughts about the white bear. Meanwhile. the situations ofone's
everyday life need not remind one oCthe thought ODe tries 10 suppress. In addition. the
situation aCtbe experiment must be inteteitingenough in ilSelf. and that can make any
shift in attention very hard. So, it seems to me that the best circumstances for intended
suppression ofa thought must be such that the thought does not have any emotional
importance, it does DOt have any practical importance., such as ooe's knowledge oCthe
name aCthe capital ofCanada, and preferably, the ciIcumstanees are such that there are
more interesting thoughts to think about than the thought one wants to suppress.
Ofcourse, one has not ceased. to know that p. ifonc has succeeded several times
to suppress the thought that p. There is always a possibility that the thought will appear
again. and it seems that there is no way to secure the state of suppression except by
shifting one's attention from the thought again and again. It is possible that the thought
will never come to one's mind again, but one can never know when the knowledge that p
is undennined so that it is never expressed in one's awareness again. And there is no
method that guarantees that the final suppression ofknowledge will ever happen. The
absence of means 10 achieve the suppression oflmowledge could suggest that this
suppression is not inlended.
Elster. for example. thinks thai the state of forgetfulness is a by-product of actions
undertaken for ends other than forgetting something (Sour 48). For example. the by-
product of my reading a book is the fact that I forgol to call Mary. According 10 Elster.
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one cannot intend to achieve the desirable state offorgettil::tg. (cannot intend to forget to
call Mary and intend to do that by reading a book. The state comes. if it comes at aU, as a
supplement, or by-product of some other action. At the same time, he docs not deny that
one could acquire the state offorgetfulness. but be insists that one should distinguish
between lhe outcome oran action that is foreseen and thaI is intended (Sour 55). Accoc·
ding to him. the states that are by·produc[S cannot be intended. but only foreseen. [lhink
that I must disagree with this analysis. The intended, or delibcrale, action ofmaking
oneself forgel what one knows is based on a principle that one starts one's non·basic
action by shifting one's attention away from the thoughts that p and hopes that at one
moment the thought and the knowledge that p will disappear. Ofcourse, the final phase
of such action is not directly controlled by the agent, but the same can be said about many
other intended actions. For example, when Jones throws a ball into a basketball net,
lanes directly controlled the flight of the ball when he threw it, but afterwards there was
no possibility to control the flight, and certainly the ball could have missed the net. I
would certainly call this action an intended action, and I would not say that the ball's
falling into the net is a by·product ofthe action. While Jones could DOt fully detennine
whether the ball would fall into the net, he wanted and inteoded it to fall there; and I think
that Jones' wanting and intending suggest that the ball's falling into the net was not a by·
product ofthe action of throwing the ball. Similarly, I think that ooecan call intended
action one's making oneself forget wbat one knows, despite the fact that one cannot
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directly control the forgetting oflhe propositionp, or one's knowledge that p is false. I
also think lhat when Davidson claims that self-deception must be intended and self-
deceivers must intentionally direct their anention away from the important evidence, be
has 10 accept this interpretation of forgetting.
I tried to show that mere an:: good reasons 10 believe that one can intend to forget
something and realize one's intention by diverting attention away from the thought.
proposition. or belief one wants to forget. Still. even ifone can make oneselfforgct what
one knows, [ have oot sbown that one can make oneselfbc:lieve what one knows is faJse.
There is no guarantee that when [ forget that buncrl1ies have six legs., I will believe that
butterflies do nOI have six legs. or that they have eight legs and are in fact spiders. Most
likely, if somebody suggested that butterflies have eight legs., I would remember the fact
that [ had successfully forgotten about butterflies baving six legs. It seems that in order
10 make oneselfbelieve what one knows is false, one bas to undenni.ne onc's knowledge
so that believing the opposite to what one knows is possible.
3.4.3 Reinterpretation ofEvidcnce
I think that the most plausible method which one could use to undermine one's
knowledge is the reinterpretation of the evidence for onc's beliefs. Beliefs that I can be
absolutely sure about are just a small fraction of my beliefs. and a bit of uncertainty is
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already a possibility for undermining the belief. Ofcourse. many beliefs that I have seem.
to me justified and true. [do not doubt that I am sitting now at my table. I do DOt doubt
that I ate my breakfast this moming and have not bad my lunch yet. Nevertheless., a
rigorous Sceptic or a wise Buddhist couId cballenge these certainties. I do not really
doubt thaI the Moon travels around the Earth. that the Europeans aCthe Middle Ages did
not know potatoes, or that in the Permian Period dragonflies were up to 70 em long. Still.
there is a chance that some great Scientist will come along, and these beliefs will turn out
Co be wrong. Thinking about the possibility ofdeliber.tte self-deception, I waDI to
mention other beliefs that have lheir own certainties and uncertainties. Ifdeliberate self-
deception is possible, one must look at the beliefs that can be doubted without involving a
group of nuclear physicists orspccialists in 18th century art. Persons who are caUed self·
deceivers usually would be self-deceived about some everyday things and problems, and
I think that, first of all, I sbould look for deliberale self-deception among beliefs lhat con-
cern problems ofeveryday life.
An interesting aspect of self-deception is the fact that sometimes argumentation
against the self-deceiver's beliefs fails to convince him or her. [can present evidence and
argwnents and be sure that the evidence and arguments [present are overwhelming and
justify my (the "correct") beliefbeyond any reasonable doubt, and when the self-deceiver
still does not want to accept my claim or clings to his or ber own, I decide that be or she
is irrational, sntpid or pretending not to understand my argwnent. It seems to me that
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there is a better explanation for such reluctance to accept reasons that persons who arc DOt
deceiving themselves would accept without doubt. [think that what. in fact., I have to
look. for is another possible interpretation aCthe evidence that forme seems to point in
one direction. I must try to detect what makes the self-deceiver's interpretation possible.
Let me look at some examples that philosophers have used when they talk about
self-deception. Amelie Oksenberg Rotty in her article "The Deceptive Self: Liars.
layers, and Lairs" describes the awkward and enigmatic behaviour cfDr. Laetitia
Androvna (11). Dr. laetitia Androvna is a specialist in the diagnosis afcaneer. Usually
she is perceptive and does not avoid open discussion willi her friends. Unfortunately. it
seems that she has a cancer. The awkward thing about Dr. Laetiti8 Androvna is that she
does not recognize the symptoms oCher cancer, while they are so obvious that anybody
who has the slightest knowledge ofmedicine would recognize them. MOm)ver. the
doctor "uncharacteristically deflects their {friends oChers} questions and attempts to
discuss her condition" (II). At the same time, Dr. Laetitia Androvna is drawing up a will
and writes letters to mends and relatives. How can Laetitia Androvna be so inconsistent
and seem not to recognize that she is such?
Of course, it is hard to know what exactly happens in Laetitia Androvna's mind,
but I certainly could try 10 order all the facts in a manner that could give an explanation of
her behaviour. First ofall, to have a cancer is not quite the same as 10 have a wooden leg
.- it is possible for both Laetitia Androvna and her friends to be mistaken about the nature
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ofthe trouble. IfLaetitia Androvna avoids going to a doctor, she probably can find other
explanations for ber- symptoms. She may be aware that there is a possibility that she bas
a cancer, but since she is oot visiting a physician and is DOl talking to her friends about
the problem. she can keep herself in the uncertain state that she prefers to the knowledge
about the state ofher heallb.. While there is some possibility ofinterpreting her symp.
toms as being symptoms of something other than cancer, she entenains the thought that
the symptoms wiU disappear and that she does not bavecancer. 1be fact that she writes a
will is nothing surprising. [f she is aware that she could have cancer, she probably would
consider it wise 10 write a will, just like one would leave home with an umbrella, if the
forecast suggests that it could rain.
The most popular example among philosophers is the example of adultery. Using
Siegler's example. I could tell the story about Brown's wife who is obviously unfaithful 10
Brown, but Brown believes thaI she is DOt (473). While 10 anybody else it seems obvious
that the wife is unfaithful. there are also obvious opportunities to explain her behaviour
without mentioning unfaithfulness. Unless Brown has witnessed a wild orgy involving
his wife and her lover. it is possible to imagine: the interpretation of evidence as evidence
not for adultel)' but for something else. For example, coming home later than usual need
not necessarily mean that one is spending the extra time: in a restaurant with the lover.
People often have to work later than usual. and why should the husband think about
adultery as the first possible explanation?
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Jeffrey Foss gives an example ofa motbC'r who convinces berselfthat bet son will
not be paralysed even though the medical testimony indicates that he will (242). Since it
is possible to imagine a situation when the par.alysis is averted despite the bad condition
of the patient. the mother is able to convince herself that ber son will escape paralysis. A
man, mentioned by Demos, convinced himself that he was a great womanizer and that
~he has had interesting adventures with the ladies" (591). The notion of'interesting
adventures' has no strict meaning, and only in exceptional cases would one be unable to
find anything that confirmed this perception ofoneself.
Certalnly, it is possible to explain things in a different way. One can even notice
certain areas where it is easy to find some justification for false beliefs. Very rarely
would pbilosopbers talk about self-deception that concerns something that one can see
with his own eyes or hear with his own ears. The only exceptions are Sackeim and Gur
who ascribe self-deception 10 persons who do oot recognize consciously their own voice
when it was played to them (173-175). Nevertheless. usually when self-deceivers deceive
themselves about some present situation, the evidence for their beliefs is usually indirect
If a husband wants to explain his wife's returning from work: late. he must explain this
using his knowledge ofms wife's character or her past.
The interpretation of the past, one's own or somebody else's, provides a great
opportunity for ajustificatioD of false beliefs that one wants to believe. One example
could be Demos' 'womanizer.' And such examples could be many. For example. ifJones
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sees within himselfa great leadership lalent and his belief is cballenged. Joncscan find in
his past something that would somehow justifYbis belief that be has leadership talents. If
Jones avoids testing his talents in practice, be can sustain bis belief in bis talents for a
very long time. however insignificant the evidence for this beliefcould be.
My future also can be interpreted according to my interests. Even ifevidence is
against my belief about something that I expect to happen in the future, I can be confident
!.hat my own petty deus ex machina will emerge from nothingness and rearrange things so
that they fit my expectations. A classical example is Hitler's belief in the victory of
Gennan troops despite the fact that the Allies were aIready in Germany.
The possibility of interpreting evidence according to one's preferences can
certainly sbed some light on unintentional self-deception. There is still the question
whether one can deceive oneselfdeliberately. The hard thing about deliberate self-
deception is the condition iliat one knows something and mes to make oneself believe the
opposite. A simple interpretation oCthe evidence is not useful for dchDcrate self·
deception because when lhe person knows something he or she has already some
interpretation oflhe evidence and. according to my definition ofdeliberate self-deception,
this interpretation is a correct one. Ifdeliberate self'"<leception is possible one must be
able to interpret lhe evidence so thai the correct justification would look lO lhe self-
deceiver to be incorrect, that is to say. one must be able to reinterpret lhe evidence.
At first, such a projecl may look easy. As I showed, in certain circumstance lhe
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evidence can favour a preferable, but a WTOog belief: Ifone can interpret evidence in a
certain way. one should have been able also to reinterpret it. Nevertheless, there are two
difficulties: one conceptual and ODe practical. The conceptuaJ difficulty is such that the
condition oCknowledge seems 10 presuppose that the belicfis justified 50 that there
cannOt be any doubt about its correctness. Iflherc is 00 uncertainty about the truth ofthe
belief and the way the evidence should be interpreted, no reinterpretation is possible and
knOWledge cannot be undermined. The second diftkulty is sucb that since self-deception
is deliberate, the self-deceiver knows that he or she is biasing the evidence and this
knOWledge can undennine the whole project ofsc:lf-deception.
Ofcourse. ifknowing is understood in lhe strictest sense, no deliberate self-
deception is possible. Nevertheless., usually one's true beliefs are not justified to such an
extent thai no other interpretation could be possible. [n everyday practice. beliefs are
justified only reasonably well. I know that the Post Office is open today. since [have
been there. r know the closing hours nftbe Post Office and I have not bean:l.lbat anything
bad has happened there. I can say lhat I know lhat the Post Office is open and my belief
is justified. It is even possible that my belief is tnle. Nevertheless, nothing can prevent
me from entertaining a plausible thought that it is closed right DOW. I remember that the
employee at the Post Office looked a little bit sick. so it is quite plausible that he felt so
bad that be went home and the Post Office is closed now. So if I had to but did not want
10 go to the Post Office, I had a reason for postponing my going there. After all, the Post
llO
Office could be closed and the walk would be futile.
As one can imagine., by the previous line of reasoning I did not convince myself
that the Post Office is closed. [do DOl really believe thai: it is closed DOW, because I know
that ( invented the sick employee. But could I deceive myself if the post office employee
looked sick? It is hard to answer the concmc example about the employee at the Post
Office, but it seems to me that under cenain circumstances [could have found an inter-
pretation of evidence that favoured this belief. For example, I could remember different
siages in the writing oflhis thesis and come up with different stories of bow [wrote it: '[
really did DOl work hard for several months, maybe only at the~' 'That was bomble., [
do not understand bow I got 10 the end;' 'From the beginning I bad the plan and the main
ideas aCthe thesis in my mind. so [just had 00 put everything on paper.' I think: deliberate
self-deception is possible.
l.S Summary
When [chose 10 write my thesis about the possibility ofdeliberate self-deception,
I did not assume that such self-deception is possible. One need not read many books in
order to know that one cannot make oncseLfbelieve just whatever one wanlS to believe.
At the same lime, I did not assume that deliberate self-deception is never possible, and I
wanted to know whether any philosopher bas provided some clue as to bow one could
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deliberately deceive oneself.
I must say the strategies philosophers a5Cn'be to self-deceivers do DOt contain any
surprising ideas on bow ODC can make oneselfbelieve something one knows or believes
to be false. Still. I tried to show that purposeful reinterpretation ofev;dcnce for one's
beliefs can form what I call deliberate self-deception. The problem with this self-
deception is that lhe evidence can be remterpreted so that one's knowledge is undermined
only in some cases. Deliberate self-deception cannot be realized on many occasion when
one perhaps would like to make oneself believe wbat one knows is false. Though [
claimed that one can deliberately reinterpret evidence For one's beliefs and also that in
certain circumstances onc can forget what one knows, I must agree with Elster that all
these methods of controlling onc's mind are fttoo costly" (Sour 57). With the phrase 'too
costly,' be certainly does not want to suggest any monetary expenses. He claims that an
intended bringing about of a mental state could be technically possible, but usually the
sacrifices one must make in order to discipline one's mind outweigh the benefits received
from the desired mental state. One can try to make oneselfbclieve that the Post Office is
closed, but usually one would not bother to persuade onesclfto believe anyt.bing so
trivial. Still. [think that this analysis of deliberate sclf-dcccprion allowed me to look at
different aspects of self-deception and the possibility ofcontrolling one's beliefs.
A large part ofthe thesis concerned the understanding of self-deception in
ordinary language and philosophical discourse. [think that the analysis of the tenn 'self·
112
deception' and bow this term is used by philosophers helped me to clarifY many aspects
of the discussion ofself-deception. Furtbennore. I tried to contribute something to a
better understanding of self-deception and human mentality in general.
If I had to evaluate which aspects ofself-deccptioD seem to be the most interesting
Olles for further studies. I would mention two ofthem. The first is directly connected
with the problem ofdeliberate self-deception. Several philosophers have suggested that
there are certain aspects of intentionality and purposefulness in self-deception. As my
analysis shows, the possibilities of deceiving oneselfdeliberately are quile scarce. There
are several problems that would be interesting to analyse. For instance. what is the differ-
ence between intentional and deliberate deception that aUows the fonner to be realized
easier than the latter? Why are certain actions not successful when intended beforehand?
Why does one's awareness that the evidence is selected intentionally undermine the self·
deception? Why is a self-deceiver who does not deceive himself or herselfdeliberately
not aware that the evidence one has is selected? In a word, what is the function of
awareness in self-deceplion?
The second aspect ofself-deception !hat is worth a closer look is !be role of
language in self-deception. The aim of my !besis was to analyse the possibility of
deceiving oneselfdeliberalely, and I was not able 10 look closer at the way people present
their beliefs, experiences and inlerpretations ofdifferent aspects oftheir life. The inter-
pretations ofevidence and experiences usually are expressed in language and have the
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form of a nanative. It is very probable that ooc's preconc:eptions, learned and traditional
illtetpretatioos of the self, albers and one's environment may shape ODe'S actual experi-
ence and result in biasing ofbelicfs.
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